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EXEC%TIVE  SUMMARY
i.  Efforts  to increase  the responsiveness  and accountability  of local
governments--as  well as fiscal  constraints  at the  central  level--have  prompted
an interest  in reviving  the  urban  property  tax  as a major  source  of municipal
revenue. At present,  the  urban  property  tax  is the  most  widely  used  municipal
tax instrument  in the developing  world,  but typically  accounts  for less than
half of municipal  recurrent  revenues.
A.  Why Focus  on Property  Tax  Administration?
ii.  As is true  of any  tax,  property  tax  yields  can  be increased  by either
increasing  tax  rates  or  reducing  losses  arising  from  evasion  and
maladministration.  In the  case  of the  property  tax,  there  is  a strong  argument
for  beginning  with  the  latter. Efforts  to increase  rates  alone  would  exaggerate
the inequities  arising  from  existing  maladministration,  placing  the  burden  of
the increese  on those who already  pay their fair share.  Improvements  in
administration  place  the  burden  or those  who evade. A focus  on administration
thus  achieves  two  objectives:  increasing  revenue  while  improving  fairness.
iii.  Brazil's experience  with urban property taxation  yields several
generalizable  lessons  on both the  practice  of property  tax  administration  and
the  process  of implementing  administrative  reforms.
B.  Improving  Administrative  Procedures
iv.  Brazilian municipalities  have  found solutions--wholly  or  partly
successful--to  several  of the  common  problems  confronting  property  taxation  in
developing  countries.
Problem: Rapid  Urban  Growth
Solution: Cross  -Referencing
v.  In a rapidly  growing  city,  a one-time  survey  of parcels  and  property
characteristics  is  obsolete  as  soon  as it  is  completed.  Property  tax  procedures
must  be capable  of discovering  and incorporating  new  construction  onto  the  tax
rolls  on an ongoing  basis. In  Brazil,  municipalities  rely  primarily  on ongoing
field  surveys  to  update  property  data. Some  success  has  also  been  achieved  with
cross-referencing:  the  use  of  data  provided  by other  agencies  of government  to
flag  changes  in  the  tax  base. One  form  of  cross-referencing,  the  tax  clearance,
is  particularly  successful:  registrars  of  deeds  will  not  recognize  a  transaction
unless  it  is  accompanied  by a certificate  from  the  assessor,  certifying  that  he
has been  notified  of it.- ii 
Problem: Scarcity  of Skills
Solution: Mass  Valuation
vi.  The  task  of  converting  visible  property  characteristics  to  an  estimate
of market  value is one that potentially  requires  a sophisticated  knowledge  of
property  markets, and leaves  considerable  discretion  to individual  property
valuers.  Local governments  in many developing countries  have difficulty
attracting  competent  staff  for  this  task,  and  have  found  that  discretion  invites
corruption.  Brazil has successfully  responded  to this problem through the
widespread  use  of a  highly  simplified  form  of  mass  appraisal. The  technique  is
based  upon  a  few  readily  observable,  measurable  characteristics  of  each  property.
No skills,  other than the ability  to measure  and write,  are required  of the
valuer  in the  field.
Problem: Inaccessible  Market  Data
Solution: Land  Value "Commissions"  and  Use of Cionstruction  Data
vii.  Accurate data on market prices is essential  to the production  of
defensible  valuations.  It is  rarely  available  through  official  sources. Prices
of real estate  transactions  are frequently understated  to avoid  real estate
transfer  taxes. Rental  data  is  often  erroneously  reported,  due  to  the  widespread
presence--and  evasion--of  rent  controls. Brazil  has  an acceptable  approach  to
the  calculation  of  unit  costs  for  buildings:  the  municipalities  use  construction
cost data, derived  from industry  sources.  Brazil  has not found  an accurate
source  of  data  on  land  prices,  and  relies  instead  upon  the  options  of  specially-
constituted  "valuation  commissions."
Problem: Inflation
Solution: Indexation
viii.  In  any  country  with  significant  inflation,  existing  valuations  rapidly
become  obsolete.  The buoyancy  of tax revenues  cannot  be maintained  without
regularly  adjusting  valuations  and  unit  costs,  or  compensatory  increases  in the
nominal  tax  rate.  Brazil  has coped  with inflation  through  the  widespread  use
of indexation.
Problem: Disputed  Liability
Solution: Broad  Legal  Definition
ix.  Collection  enforcement  depends  upon  the  ability  to  identify  the  person
liable  for  paying  the tax.  While  property  is  visible  and easily  defined,  tax
liability  is  not. Records  of  ownership  or  tenancy  agreements  may  be  inaccessible
to  the  taxing  authority. In  Brazil,  liability  effectively  extends  to  any  person
in  beneficial  occupation  of the  property. In  employing  this  broad  definition,
the  municipalities  are successfully  relieved  of any legal  obligation  to prove
legal  ownership  before  imposing  the  tax.
Problem: Slow  Judicial  Procedures
Solution: Tax  Clearances
x.  Enforcement  also depends  upon the government's  ability to impose
penalties  swiftly  and  consistently.  The  judicial  processes  for  collecting  civil- iii  -
debts are often slow and expensive  in developing  countries.  In principle,
administrative  enforcement  mechanisms  can exploit  the government's  role as a
provider  of public  services,  granter  of permits  and recorder  or guarantor  of
property ownership to give the taxing authority leverage over delinquent
taxpayers.  Brazilian municipaiities  have attempted to use  a  variety of
administrative  mechanisms  to  enforce  collections.  Only  one--a  tax  clearance  for
deed  registration--is  consistently  effective,  but  its  use  is  limited: taxpayers
who  have no intention  of transferring  title  are  unaffected.
C.  Making  Technical  Assistance  More Effective
xi.  Brazil's experience in implementing  improvements  in property tax
administration  on a large  scale--exemplified  by the federal  government's  CIATA
program--also  yields several  lessons  for the design  of technical  assistance
programs  in general.
xii.  CIATA  is  a  nation-wide  program  of technical  assistance.  It  is  intended
to  produce a  comprehensive  valuation of  the  tax  base, with  supporting
documentation,  in  each  participating  municipality.  Within  its  narrowly-defined
objectives,  it is  highly  successful. Three  characteristics  of CIATA's  method
of  delivery  account  for  its  success  in  delivering  technical  assistance  or.  a  mass
scale:
(a)  Prepackaging:  CIATA  is  delivered  as  a  standardized  package,  using
identical  materials  and following  essentially  the same sequence
of steps  in each  project  municipality. As a result,  no time  is
lost developing  new materials  for each project,  and all CIATA
procedures  and  materials  are  thoroughly  field-tested.
(b)  Permanent  staff:  Individual  projects  are managed  by members  of
a  permanent  CIATA  staff,  who  are  able  to  draw  on  experience  gained
in prior  projects.
(c)  Collaborative  roles  for  CIATA,  local  staff:  The responsibility
of the  CIATA  project  manager  is  confined  to  management.  He  remains
on-site  throughout  project  implementation,  but  all  other  manpower
is provided  by the regular  assessor's  staff and locally-hired
interns.  As  a  result  of  this  collaborative  division  of  functions,
the  assessor's  staff  "learn  by  doing"  and  are  able  to  maintain  the
system  once  it is in  place.
xiii.  While  CIATA  consistently  results  in  an increase  in total  valuations,
its  impact  on  actual  revenues  is  mixed. Increases  in  valuations  are  often  offset
by  reductions  in  effective  tax  rates  or  by  declining  collection  efficiency.  Even
where tax revenues  rise substantially  in  percentage  terms,  the  absolute  level
of property  taxes  remains  low. As a result,  the  costs  of administering  the  tax
consume  too  large  a  proportion  of its  yields.- iv  -
Broadening  the  Scope
xiv.  To an extent,  these  results  reflect  CIATA's  narrow  scope,  and could
be  counteracted  by broadening  the  range  of technical  assistance  offered. CIATA
has, in fact,  recently  added  a  collection  monitoring  component  in  an attempt  to
forestall  declines  in collection  efficiency.
xv.  But  it  also  reflects  the  political  environment  confronting  the  property
tax.  Local politicians'  decisions  to reduce  effective tax rates or relax
collection  enforcement  are responses  to an environment  that discourages  the
effective  use  of local  taxes.
Increasing  Project  Selectivity.  Altering  Incentives
xvi.  What does this imply for the design  of such technical  assistance
programs? First,  it implies  a need for greater  selectivity  in the choice  of
participating  jurisdictions. Some  CIATA  projects  would  not  have been  viable--
even from a financial  standpoint--under  any plausible  range  of tax rates  and
collection  efficiencies.  Such  projects  could  have  been  identified  and  excluded
through a preproj6ct  analysis  of the tax base and its administrative  cost
implications.
xvii.  Second,  it  suggests  a  need  to  accompany  technically-focused
interventions,  such as CIATA,  with broader  policy  reform.  In Brazil's  case,
the  disincentives  for  local  taxation  arise  from  the  vague  division  of  functional
responsibilities  between  levels  of government  and from the  existing  system  of
intergovernmental  transfers. Reform  should  not aim at encouraging  local  tax
effort  per  se:  a  high level  of local  tasation  is  not  an  end in itself. But it
should  aim  at removing  disincentives  to local  taxation  and  providing  taxpayers
with an unbiased  basis on which to judge the case for an increase  in local
taxation.-V.
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LESSONS FRON BRAZIL
I.  INTRODUCTION
1.01  The  property  tax  is  the  most  widely  used  municipal  tax  instrument  in
the  developing  world. In  most  developing  countries  with  large  urban  populations,
some  form  of property  tax  is assigned  to the  support  of local  governments.
1.02  In principle, it is well suited to the cot  Lons of developing
countries:
*  Compared  to other forms of taxation,  it is undemanding  in its
data requirements. The properi:y  tax  does  not require  taxpayers
to maintain  financial  records,  but is instead  based upon the
vlsible  characteristics  of  property  itself.
i  It  would  appear  to  be difficult  to  evade,  even  where  government's
krnowledge  of the income  or location  of taxpayers is limited.
Property cannot  be hidden (unlike income) and does nob mc.'e
(unlike  people  and  automobiles).
F  Finally,  it is amenable  to enforcement  through  tax clearances.
Government's  role as a repository  of records on real estate
transactions  puts  it  in  a  position  to  use  the  inducement  of tenure
security  to  enforce  property  tax  collection,  avoiding  the  lengthy
and expensive  court  processes  characteristic  of many developing
countries.
1.03  In practice, the performance  of  the property tax is generally
unimpressive. In most LDC cities,  property  taxes  lag behind local  business
taxes and intergovernmental  transfers  as sources of unrestricted  recurrent
revenue. Costs  of  administering  the  property  tax  consume  a large  proportion  of
its  gross  yields,  leaving  little  net revenue  to finance  municipal  services.
A.  Phy Focus  on  Tax  Administration?
1.04  Efforts  to i-t  ease the responsiveness  and accountability  of local
governments  have pr'moted  an interest  in reviving  the  urban  property  tax as a
major  source  of  muni  ,al  revenue. Fiscal  constraints  at  the  central  level  have
reinforced  this trexid. Central  governments'  capacity  to finance  increasing
levels  of intergovernmental  transfers  has  declined.  Growth  in  business  taxation
is constrained  by  the threat of  fiscal competition  with higher level of
government.
1.05  As is true of any tax,  there  are two  ways to increase  property  tax
yields:  one  can either  increase  the  tax  rate  or reduce  losses  resulting  from
maladministration.  In the case  of the  property  tax,  there  is a good case for
starting  with administration.1.06  First, the losses  are often substantial.  In many cities, large
nuribers  of properties  are  missing  altogether  from  the  tax  rolls,  properties  on
the tax rolls are underassessed  and assessments  go unpaid due to haphazard
collection  enforcement.
1.07  Second,  the  alternative  is politically  less attractive. Any effort
to increase  the  tax  rate  on a  badly  administered  base  exaggerates  inequities  in
the distribution  of the  property  tax  burden,  and carries  potentially  serious
political  costs.
1.08  Finally,  there  is  a fairness  argument: increases  in tax  rates  place
the burden of the tax increase  on those  who already  pay.  Improvements  in
administration  place  the  burden  on  those  who  evade. Administrative  improvements
thus :..ncrease  revenues  by improving  fairness.
1.09  Brazil  is  typical of  the  environment  confronting property tax
administration  in  developing  countries.  Urban  growth  is  rapid,  valuation  skills
are scarce,  market  data is inaccessible,  ownership  is disputed  and judicial
processes  are  slow. Brazil's  efforts  to  improve  the  performance  of the  property
tax  contain  lessons  for  other  countries  grappling  with similar  problems. Two
efforts  are  particularly  noteworthy:  a  high-tech  resurveying  program  undertaken
in the  municipality  of Rio de Janeiro  and a  nationwide  program  of technical
assistance  for  local  tax  administration,  termed  CIATA.11
1.10  The remainder  of this  section  describes  the  institutional  background
of property  taxation  in Brazil. Section  II discusses  the  features  of property
tax administration  common  throughout  Brazil.  Sections  III and IV provide  an
analysis  of the  Rio  and  CIATA  cases,  respectively,  and  Section  V concludes  with
a  discussion  of the  generalizable  lessons  arising  from  the  Brazalian  case.
B.  Municigal  Government  in  Brazil
1.11  Brazil  is  big. In terms  of  land  area,  it  is  the  fifth  largest  country
in the  world.  Its  population  totals  about  130  million. In economic  terms,  it
is  considered  middle  income. Per  capita  GNP  is  about  US$1,800,  roughly  the  same
as  Mexico  and  about  one-tenth  that  of the  U.S.
1.12  The country is also highly urbanized.  Seventy percent of  the
population--95  million people--live in cities.  The  urban population is
increasing  rapidly,  averaging  an annual  increase  of about  four  million  people.
1.13  The property  tax is assessed  and collected  by local governments.
Local governments  in Brazil--termed  munlclplos--are  one of three levels of
government  in the country's federal structure.  The central government  is
headquartered  in  the  federal  district  of  Brasilia.  The  rest  of  Brazil  is  divided
into 23 states  and three territories. The municipalities  are geographical
subdivisions  of the  states  and  number  about  4,000. Like  counties  in the  United
.1/  Between 1964 and 1982,  mayors of state capitals  were appointed  by the
governors  of their  respective  states.- 3 -
States,  the  municipalities  may include  both  urban  and  rural  areas. Brazil  has
no distinct  form  of urban  government.
1.14  By the  standards  of developing  countries,  the  municipalities  enjoy  a
high degree  of  autonomy. All  have  a  mayor-council  form  of government,  and  both
mayor and council  are locally  elected.  Municipalities  have the authority  to
determine  the  tax  rates  and  administrative  procedures  of  the  two  tax  bases  under
their control,  and can adopt and execute  their  annual  budgets  without  prior
approval  of higher  levels  of government.
1.15  The  functional responsibilities  of municipalities  are  not well
defined.  The large  municipalities  lost the role they once had in providing
water,  sewer,  and--in  some  cases,  electricity--to  urban  areas,  when  state  level
utilities  took  over these  functions  in the  1960s. Public  security--police  and
fire  protection--has  traditionally  been  provided  by the  states. Responsibility
for primary  education  is shared  with state  governments  through  a variety of
complex  arrangements  which  have  produced  parallel  systems  in  some  municipalities
and fluctuating  cost-sharing  agreements  in others.  Public  health--other  than
refuse  collection--Is  similarly  ajoint  municipality--state  responsibility.  Only
the  collection  of  refuse  and  the  construction  and  maintenance  of  local  roads  (and
related  drainage  works  and  street  lighting)  are  unambiguously  municipal.
1.16  The  revenues  of  Figure  1
municipal  governments  are
dominated  by  inter-
governmental transfers, as
shown  in  Figure  1.  Brazilian  Sources of Municipal  Revenue
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1.17  The  ambiguity of
municipal  functional
responsibilities, combined
with the availability  of alternative,  less politically  sensitive  sources  of
funds,  has  undermined  political  support  for  property  taxation.  The  property  tax
is not associated  with any major group of services,  nor is it perceived  as
essential  to the  day-to-day  operations  of  municipal  government.- 4  -
1.18  As a result, the contribution  of the property tax to municipal
revenues  is small. In 1984--the  most  recent  year for  which  aggregate  data  are
available--property  taxes contributed  8 percent of total  municipal tax and
transfer  revenue. The  service  tax  contributed  12 percent. Transfers--chiefly
fixed  shares  of state  and  federal  taxes--contributed  the  remaining  80  percent.
1.19  The  size  of this  contribution  has  declined  since  the  present  structure
of local  finance  was established  in 1967 (see Figure  1).  During  the 1970s,
property  tax revenues  increased  by 250  percent  in real terms.  Revenues  from
transfers  increased  at an  equivalent  rate,  and  business  taxes,  somewhat  faster.
As a result,  the contribution  of property  taxes to total  municipal  revenues
fluctuated  between  10  percent  and 15  percent  during  this  period.
1.20  Beginning  in  1979,  Figure  2
however,  property  tax  revenues
began  to  decline  in  absolute  terms.
This  downturn corresponded  to a
period of accelerating  inflation  Property  Tax  Buoyancy
and  recession  in  Brazil.  As  shown  Trends in GDP,  Inflation, and Revenue
in  Figure  2,  annual  inflation  began
to exceed  50  percent in 1979,  and  an
growth  in  GDP  virtually ceased  S  nu
during  the  first  four  years  of the  2.5  _
decade.  Property tax revenues--  2  1
which had closely paralleled  GDP  1.5
growth  during the 1970s--declined  ..  ... xx
by  19 percent between 1979 and  I........-
1980,  and  continued to  decline  '  i  to  7i  72  n  7  'A  i  i  C'i  2 A I
steeply  during  the following  four  Yew
years.  - - T.fr1"WtVtO  . .l
1.21  The  importance of  the
property tax varies widely among
municipalities,  in both relative
and  absolute  terms. The  per  capita
revenues  of selected  municipalities  are illustrated  in Figure  3.  The figure
divides municipalities  between Brazil's two major economic regions:  the
wealthier south/southeast,  and  the  less  industrialized  north/northeast.
Individual  municipality  data is  provided  for  Brazil's  nine largest  cities  (all
state  capitals). Aggregate  data is provided  for  other  state  capitals  and all
other  municipalities  in  each  region.
1.22  As shown,  the property  tax  makes its largest  contribution--in  both
absolute  and  relative  terms--in  Brazil's  largest  cities. Property  tax  revenues
in Sao Paulo--Brazil's  largest city--were  equivalent  to US$11 in 1984 and
provided  20 percent  of  recurrent  revenues  in  1984. Yields  in  other  major  cities
in the  south  ranged  from  US$4  to  US$9  per  capita,  and  contributed  10  percent  to
20 percent  of municipal  revenues. Yields  in  major  northern  cities  were lower
in absolute  terms,  but  made an equivalent  contribution  to recurrent  municipal
revenues,  comprising  10-15  percent  of the  total.Figure  3
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1.23  Outside of  major  cities, the  yield  of  the  property tax  was
considerably  lower;  and  its  contribution  less  significant.  Property  tax  revenues
in the  smaller  southern  capitals  averaged  US$3  capita;  in the  smaller  northern
capitals,  US$1.50.  Revenues in the noncapital  municipalities  of the south
averaged  US$2.10. In the  noncapital  municipalities  of the  north,  property  tax
revenues  averaged  only 22 cents  per capita,  and  contributed  only 2 percent  of
municipal  recurrent  revenues.- 6  -
II.  URBAN  PROPERTY  TAX  ADMINISTRATION
2.01  Although the municipalities  enjoy considerable  autonomy in their
administration  of  the  property  tax,  certain  characteristics  are  commo  ily  observed
throughout  the  country.  The  legal  base  of the  property  tax  is  defined  by  federal
law, and consists  of all real property--land  and buildings--within  the urban
zones  of  a  municipalities.  The  specific  boundaries  of  an  urban  zone  are  formally
defined  by  municipal  ordinance.  To  be included  in  an  urban  zone,  a  property  must
either  be currently  provided  with two  of five  urban  services  (sidewalks,  water,
street  lighting,  or a public  school  or  health  post  within  three  kilometers)  or
be  defined  as "urbanizable"  on the  basis  of  approved  subdivision  plans. Certain
exemptions (for property owned  by  government, religious and  charitable
institutions)  are  mandated  by federal  law.
A.  Identification  of  Tax  Object
2.02  Most municipalities  have, at some time,  assembled  a parcellary  map
of the urban areas  within their  jurisdiction  and a set of property  records,
listing  owners  of record  and  property  characteristics.  The tax  maps serve  as
the  basic  tool for identifying  properties  for  tax  purposes,  in the  absence  of
reliable  systems  of street  addresses.
B.  Valuation
2.03  Value,  for tax purposes,  is legally  defined  as market,  or capital,
value.  Vacant  land  and common  types  of residential  and  commercial  structures
are  valued  using  mass  appraisal  techniques.
2.04  Mass appraisal  uses a small  number  of physical  characteristics  to
derive  an estimate  of  a  property's  value. In  Brazil,  the  mass  appraisal  process
begins  with the calculation  of standard  "unit  costs"  for land  and structures.
The  cost  of  land  in  different  neighborhoods  is  calculated  and  expressed  in  terms
of  a cost  per  square  meter  of plot  size. The  cost  of  buildings  of  various  types
is calculated  and  expressed  in terms  of a cost  per square  meter  of floor  area.
Individual  properties  are valued  by applying  these  standard  unit cost to the
respective  plot  size  and  floor  area  of specific  properties.  Adjustment  factors
are applied to these valuations  to reflect other characteristics--slope  or
susceptibility  to flooding  in the  case of land,  age  and condition  in the  case
of structures--which  would  affect  their  value.
2.05  The  validity  of such valuations  depends  on the  accuracy  of the  unit
costs.  This is a persistent  source  of difficulty  in Brazil.  In industrial
countries,  unit costs for structures  are typically  based upon the cost of
replacing  the  structure,  less  an  allowance  for  depreciation.  Replacement  costs
are based  upon current  construction  prices,  derived  from industry  sources.a'
2/  In the  U.S.,  for  example,  several  prlvate  firms  publish  standard  construction
cost schedules  for  varlous  classes  of buildlngs.-7-
Unit costs  for  land  are  calculated  through  an analysis  of recent  sales.V 1 Data
on recent  sales  are  provided  to the  assessor  by the  registrar  of deeds.
2.06  Brazilian  municipalities  use a similar  depreciated  replacement  cost
method to calculate  the  unit cost of structures. Construction  cost data is
provided  by local contractors  or is extrapolated  from Brazilian  construction
industry  publications. They  have more difficulty  estimating  the  unit cost of
land.  In principle,  information  on the  price of land transactions  would be
available  from  two  sources: (i)  the  registrars  of deeds--termed  cartorios--who
record  deeds  of conveyance,  and (ii)  the  state  finance  department,  which--until
the  tax  was  reassigned  to  the  municipal  level-  -administered  a  tax  on  the  transfer
of real  property. The  prices  reported  to these  official  sources  are,  however,
grossly  understated  in order  to minimize  property  transfer  taxes.  To address
this problem,  municipalities  generally  rely on specially  appointed  valuation
commissions  to prepare unit cost tables for land.  These commissions  are
comprised  of  major  landowners  and  real  estate  brokers,  who  are  presumed  to  have
access  to accurate  market  information. No specific  methodology  governs  their
deliberations,  and  their results are  conceded to be  inaccurate, if not
deliberately  distorted  in favor  of particular  constituencies.
C. Procedures  for  Updating  Assessment  Rolls
2.07  The need to discover  and incorporate  changes in the tax base is
particularly  acute in Brazil.  Due to the  country's  rapid  urban  growth  rate,
the tax base is rapidly changing:  new  land parcels are created through
subdivision  and expansion  of the "urban  zone;"  new buildings  are constructed
and existing  ones  improved;  and  changes  in  ownership  occur.
2.08  To discover and incorporate  changes in property characteristics,
Brazilian  municipalities  do  not  rely  on  regularly  scheduled  general  revaluations.
Several  parallel  strategies  are instead  used to discover  and incorporate  the
various  types  of change  in the  tax  base.
Cross-referencing
2.09  As in  many industrial  countries,  Brazilian  municipal  ordinances  call
for  a system  of cross-referencing  between  agencies  of government  to assist  the
assessor  in discovering  changes  in property  characteristics. In theory,  the
public  sector,  in  carrying  out  its  regulatory  and  judicial  functions,  is  involved
in  most  significant  changes  in  the  property  tax  base. Subdivision  proposals  must
be approved by the municipal  public works or planning department.  Major
construction  requires  a  building  permit  ex  ante  and  an  occupancy  permit  ex  post.
Changes  in  ownership  must  be registered  by cartorios. Cross-referencing  should
be an effective  device  for  transferring  this  information  to the  assessor.
I/  Because  sales  of vacant  land  are  rare In  mature  neighborhoods,  land  prices
are  often  extrapolated  from  sales  of built-upon  properties. The  value  of land
in such cases  Is determined  by calculating  the  cost of the  structure  (on  the
basis  of depreciated  replacement  cost)  and  subtracting  it from the  gross  sales
price  of the  property.-8-
CROSS-REFERENCING  PROCEDURES
Action  Sought  by Taxpayer  From  Agency  Flags  Change  in  Tax  Base
Approval  of subdivision  public  works  new land  parcel
Building,  occupancy  permit  public  works  new,  improved  building
Registration  of title  cartorio  change  in ownership
BOX  1
2.10  Two  cross-referencing  approaches  (summarized  in  Box  1) are  attempted
in  Brazil. In  the  first,  the  cross-referencing  agency  provides  the  information
directly  to the  assessor: the  department  of public  works  or planning  notifies
the  assessor  of recent  subdivision  approvals  and  building  permits;  the  cartorio
provides  the  assessor  with a list  of recently  registered  deeds  of conveyance.
2.11  The second  approach  brings the  taxpayer  directly  into the process.
This  approach  takes  advantage  of the  taxpayer's  interest  in  obtaining  an  action
from the government:  a  subdivision  approval,  occupancy permit or  title
registration.  Action is made contingent  upon the taxpayer's  obtaining a
clearance  from  the  assessor,  certifying  that  he  has  been  informed. In this  way,
information  on changes  in the property  tax  base is conveyed  direct'Ly  by the
taxpayer  to the  assessor;  the  cooperating  agency  of government  acts merely  as
an enforcement  agent.
2.12  Brazil's  experience  with cross-referencing  has been disappoint'.ng.
Several  reasons  are cited.
2.13  First,  many  of the  changes  in  the  property  tax  base  occur  outside  the
system  of  formal  permits  and  registrations.  Some  are  legally  outside  't: minor
building  improvements  may  not  require  a  permit. Many  occur  in  violacion  of the
law: buildings  are  constructed  without  permits;  land  is occupied  illegally.
2.14  Second, the cross-referencing  agencies  are often uncoopirat.ve  or
inefficient.  Public  works departments  and cartorlos  appear to attach low
priority  to cooperating  with the assessor. Rio's  cartorlos,  for  example,  are
three  years  behind  in  providing  the  names  of  new  property  owners  to  the  asitessor.
2.15  Of  the  two  cross-referencing  approaches, the  second--where  the
taxpayer  is directly  involved--is  the more consistently  successful.  It is
particularly  successful  in two  cases:  (i)  when imposed  by the public  works
department  as  a  condition  of granting  an  occupancy  permit;  and  (ii)  when  imposed
by the  cartorio  as a condition  of registering  a deed  of sale.  The former  case
serves  to  bring  new  construction  to  the  assessor's  attention;  the  latter,  to  flag
changes  in  ownership,  including  the  sale  of recently  subdivided  parcels.-9-
Voluntary  ComDliance
2.16  Taxpayers may also  be induced to voluntarily  supply information
directly  to the  assessor,  particularly  where  it involves  changes  in  ownership.
Because  property  ownership  in Brazil  is subject  to dispute,  purchasers  will
often register  their  property  with the assessor  in an attempt to strengthen
their claim.* 1 Registration  on the property tax rolls does not  legally
constitute  a  recognition  by government  of  a  taxpayer's  claim,  but  in  the  absence
of contrary  evidence,  it is often  accepted  as such  by the  courts. In order  to
avoid liability  for  property  they  no longer  own, sellers  of property  may also
notify  the  assessor  of a change  in ownership.
2.17  Experience  with voluntary compliance  is mixed.  In Recife, the
assessor reports a high degree of compliance  among property owners with
particularly  dubious  claims. In towns  where  absentee  ownership  of  vacant  urban
land  is  widespread,  assessors  report  great  difficulty  in  determining  ownership,
and  little  cooperation  on the  part  of property  owners.
2.18  Cross-referencing  and  voluntary  compliance  do not  eliminate  the  need
for site visits and additional  investigation. !'roposed  subdivisions  or new
construction--although  approved  by the  public  works  department--may  never  take
place,  and  therefore  have  to  be  verified. Subdivision  plans  and  building  permit
applications  may not provide sufficient  information  to permit an in-office
valuation.  Voluntary compliance  is only effective  in bringing changes in
ownership  to the assessor's  attention. As a result,  cross-referencing--even
where  it  works--serves  only  a limited  function: that  of  bringing  changes  in  the
tax  base to the  assessor's  attention.
Ongoing  Field  Surveys
2.19  To supplement  these  indirect  means  of discovering  changes  in  the  tax
base,  assessors  rely  extensively  on  field  work  by their  own  staff. Staff  of  the
assessors office--termed  fiscais--regularly  patrol designated  zones of the
-/  Thls  problem  has  deep  historical  roots. Present  claims  to  property  ownership
descend,  In  princlple, from  grants  made  by the  Portuguese  klng  in the  sixteenth
century. As these  grants  were contingent  upon the  productive  use  of  property,
the  colonLal  authorities  rarely  objected  when  new  settlers  took  over  parcels  of
unused  land  for thelr  own  use,  regardless  of  whether  the  land  had  already  been
granted  to  someone  else. By the  mid-elghteenth  century,  overlapping  claims  were
widespread.  Shortly after independence  (1822),  laws were enacted  to enable
squatters  to legalize  their  clalms,  but these  opportunities  were not widely
exploLted.  New  disputes  over  land  ownership  have  emerged  in  the  wake  of  Brazil's
urbanization.  Low-Lncome  households,  unable  to  obtain  urban  land  legally,  often
resort  to Illegal  occupation  on public  or private  land.
Brazil's  prlvate  deeds  registrars--the  cartorios-  -record  claims  to  property.
Deeds,  of course,  are  merely  evidence  that  a particular  transaction  has taken
place,  and do not constltute  proof  of legal  ownership. Property  descriptions
contained  on  deeds  are  also  often  unclear,  and  are  not  supported  by  monumentation
on the  ground,  glving  rise  to disputes  over  boundaries.- 10  -
municipalities,  noting  new  construction  and evidence  of impending  subdivisions
and  sales.
General  Revaluations
2.20  Over time, the occasional  failures  of these  maintenance  procedures
result in  the  accumulation  of  a  significant  number of omissions.  All
municipalities  are therefore  forced  to eventually  undertake  general  resurveys.
In most industrial  countries,  general  resurveys  are carried  out at periodic
intervals. These  resurveys  are  normally  comprehensive: an effort  is made to
physically  inspect  each property  and verify  the information  contained  on its
corresponding  property  record.
2.21  In Brazil,  general  resurveys  are  neither  periodic  nor  comprehensive.
No municipality  attempts  to follow  a predetermined  schedule  for resurveying
properties.  The scope of such resurveys,  when they occur,  is often highly
selective. Some  municipalities  survey  only  the  zone  of  urban  expansion,  making
no effort to verify ownership  and property  characteristics  in neighborhoods
already  on the tax rolls.  Resurveys  may be further  limited  to higher-income
neighborhoods  or to  classes  of  property  on  which  major  increases  in  revenue  are
expected.
D.  Inflation  Adjustments
2.22  Municipalities  have  two  means  of  adjusting  the  level  of the  property
tax  in  their  jurisdictions.  They  may  either  adjust  the  nominal  tax  rate,  or they
may  make an  across-the-board  adjustment  in  property  assessments.  The  latter  is
far  more  widely  used,  and  has  been  crucial  to  the  viability  of the  property  tax.
2.23  Brazil  has experienced  high rates  of inflation  during  most of the
twentieth  century.  In the 25 years  between 1962 and 1987,  annual  inflation
averaged  65  percent,  a cumulative  total  of 286,000  percent. In  the  first  seven
years  of the  1980s,  annual  inflation  has  averaged  160  percent. To  maintain  the
buoyancy  of tax  revenues,  Brazilian  municipalities  index  valuations.
2.24  Federal  law gives the  municipalities  considerable  latitude  in this
regard. Municipalities  are  permitted  to  make annual  increases  in  valuations,
at a uniform percentage  rate,  without physical inspection  of  individual
properties,  provided  the  adjustment  is approved  by the  municipal  council  as a
whole. Mayors  may  make these  adjustments  unilaterally,  provided  the  percentage
increase  does  not exceed  the  official  inflation  index  for  treasury  bonds.
2.25  These  adjustments  apply  both to existing  valuations  and to the  unit
costs  used  to  value  new  construction.  As a  result,  new  construction  and  existing
construction  are  valued  at  consistent  prices. Because  the  adjustments  are  not
based  upon actual  price  changes  in the  real  estate  market,  the  assessed  values
and actual market values tend to diverge.  Particularly  during periods of
hyperinflation,  adjustments  lag  actual  inflation  in  market  prices,  resulting  in
a gradual  decline  in  assessed  values  in  real terms.- 11  -
E.  Tax  Rates  and  Exemption  Policies
2.26  Municipalities  use  nominal  tax  rates  and  exemption  policies  to  pursue
a  vatiety  of  policy  objectives.  Vacant  land  is  generally  taxed  at  a  higher  rate
than developed  property  in an effort  to discourage  land speculation. Recife,
for  example,  imposes  a 1  percent  rate  on  developed  property  (both  the  structure
and land  components),  but taxes  vacant  land  at 3  percent.
2.27  Rio  uses  the  tax  structure  to  pursue  both  land  use  and  distributional
objectives.  The  tax  structure  on  vacant  land  is  differentiated  by socioeconomic
zone and loc  size:  small  lots in the  city's  poorer  northern  zone  are subject
to a rate of 0.5 percent.  Large  lots in the southern  part of the city are
subject  to rates  as high as 7  percent.  Rio's  rates  on developed  property  are
differentiated  by floor  area:  the smallest  category  of residential  structure
is subject  to a tax  rate  of 0.6  percent;  the  largest,  1.2  percent.
2.28  Both Rio and Recife exempt certain classes of small residential
properties,  in an attempt  to achieve  distributional  objectives.  In Rio, the
exemption  is  based  upon  a  property's  tax  liability:  residential  properties  with
a tax  liability  of less  than  0.2  "standard  units"  5/  are  exempted. Recife  bases
its  exemptlon  on a more complex  set of conditions: the  property  must have a
floor  area  of less than  50  meter  square,  it  must  be owner-occupied,  it  must  be
the  owner's  only  property,  and the  owner's  monthly  income  must  not exceed  four
standard  units.l/  Both Rio and Recife have a de facto  policy of exempting
properties  in squatter  settlements.
2.29  Given the low absolute  level  of property  taxation  in Brazil,  it is
unlikely  that  these  rate  and  exemption  policies  achieve  their  intended  impacts
on land  use  or income  distribution  to any  siginificant  degree.
F.  Billing  and  Collection
2.30  Liability  for  the  property  tax  rests  with the  owner  of the  property.
"Ownership"  is  broadly  defined  and  extends  to  any  person  in  beneficial  occupation
of the  property  in question. The municipality  is thus relieved  of the legal
obligation  to demonstrate  ownership--in  the  sense  of documents  registered  with
the  cartorio--before  imposing  the  tax.
2.31  The  municipal  treasurer  is  responsible  for  the  production  and  delivery
of tax  bills.  Bills  are generally  printed  and  delivered  in the first  quarter
5/  The standard  unit--termed  UNIF in  Rio--is  a reference  value,  fixed  by the
municipio.  It is expressed  as a multiple  of the  price of national  treasury
bond,  the  OTN. The  prlce  of  an  OTN,  In  terms  of  cruzados,  is  regularly  adjusted
to  compensate  for  inflation.  In  October  1987  Rio's  UNIF  was  fixed  at  2.34  OTNs,
and  was equlvalent  to  Cz 999.65  or US$19.50.
j/  Recife's  standard  unit  was  fixed  at 3.5  OTNs,  as of  October  1987. Recife's
Income  ceillng  was therefore  equivalent  to US$116.  This is about twice  the
minimum  wage.- 12 -
of the  tax  year.  Where  a  property  is occupied  solely  by tenants,  the  delivery
of the  bills to  one tenant  constitutes  notification.
2.32  Most municipalities  allow  the taxpayer  the  option  of paying  the  tax
as a single  payment  or in a series  of installments.  Inflation  can,  of course,
quickly  reduce  real value of payments  made late in the  year.  To discourage
installment  payments,  municipalities  offer incentives  to taxpayers  paying in
full  at the  beginning  of the  tax  year.
2.33  Some  also  increase  the  assessments  on installment  payments  to  reflect
ongoing inflation.  The mechanics  of doing so are complicated.  Brazilian
inflation,  while  always  high, is also  unstable.  In the  years 1985, 1986  and
1987, for example,  annual inflation  totaled  235 percent,  76 percent  and 390
percent,  respectively.  Municipalities  are thus  in  a poor  position  to forecast
the  level  of inflation  before  the  tax  year  begins. Some  municipalities  address
this  problem  by  billing  twice  a  year,  and  adjusting  the  second  payment  to  reflect
inflation  during  the  first  six  months. Others  require  taxpayers  to  adjust  their
own tax  assessments,  using  an official  index  published  in the  newspaper.
2.34  Bills  are  generally  paid  in  person. For  the  convenience  of taxpayers,
payments  may be made  at the  branches  of designated  private  banks.  These  banks
are  compensated  by permitting  them  the  use  of  tax  funds,  interest-free,  for  five
days.
G.  Enforcement
2.35  Municipal  ordinances  provide  for  stiff  financial  penalties  for late
payment.  Bills  not paid by their  due date are typically  subject  to a 15-20
percent  fine.  Both the  tax  bill and the  fine  are subject  to  monthly  interest
charges  of 1  percent,  and the  bill,  the fine  and the  interest  charges  are all
subject  to inflation  indexing. Any  taxpayer  with  an  outstanding  balance  at the
end  of the tax  year is designated  a general  debtor  of the  municipality,  and is
subject  to  prosecution  through  the  civil  courts.
2.36  Legal  prosecution,  however,  takes  a long time.  Recife's  treasurer
estimates  that  the  period  between  the  initial  designation  of  a  delinquent  account
and the final  judgement  by the courts  averages  five  years.  The costs to the
municipality  of legal  representation  are  also high.  Municipalities  thus tend
to negotiate  out-of-court  settlements  with delinquent  taxpayers,  rather  than
pursuing  cases  to their  ultimate  conclusion.  The  willingness  of  municipalities
to  negotiate  contributes  to  poor  collection  efficiency.  Estimates  of  collection
efficiency  on current  account  range  from  40  percent  to  60  percent. (Figu_.s  on
the  proportion  of arrears  that  are  eventually  collected  are  not  available.)
2.37  In  principle,  municipalities  could  also  use  a  number  of  administrative
procedures  to  enforce  collection.  The  clearance  procedures  used  to  flag  changes
in  property  characteristics  can  also  be  used  to  enforce  payment. Property  owners
may be required  to obtain  a property  tax clearance  in order to apply for a
subdivision  approval,  a building  or occupancy  permit,  or to register  a deed of
sale.  Only the last of these  has been used with much consistency,  and its
usefulness  is  limited.  Taxpayers  who  here  no  intention  of  selling  their  property
are  not  affected  by it.- 13 -
III.  THE RIO CASE
3.01  There  have  been several  recent  efforts  to improve  the  performance  of
the  property  tax  in  Brazil. Some  have  been  prompted  by immediate  fiscal  crises;
others  by the  persistence  of low  absolute  levels  of revenue. Their  experience
is  relevant  to efforts  to improve  property  tax  performance  in  other  countries.
3.02  The  lessons  provided  by their  experiences  are  of two  types:
*  those  arising  from  the  specific  technical  or  procedural  innovation
introduced  under  the  reforms;  and
*  those  concerned  with the  process  of reform  itself: the  scope  of
reform,  manpower  and  organizational  aspects,  and  costs.
3.03  Rio's  recent  property  tax  reform  illustrate3  the  use  of  sophisticated
technology  to lower the labor  costs and speed  the implementation  of a major
resurveying  effort.
3.04  The  Rio  reform  was  prompted  by  an immediate  fiscal  crisis. As a  major
center  of  Brazilian  manufacturing,  Rio  was  profoundly  affected  by the  recession
of the early 1980.  The recurrent  revenues  of municipality  declined  by one
third--in  real terms  between  1979  and 1983.  Property  tax  revenues  dropped  by
40 percent.  Re"urrent  expenditure  proved  less flexible,  due in part to the
irreducibility  of expenditure  on primary  education.ZI  As a result,  recurrent
expenditure  declined  by only  12  percent  between  1979  and  1983. By  1983,  Rio  was
running  a current  account  deficit  equal  to 8  percent  of recurrent  revenue.
3.05  The  municipality's  response  was to make a major  attempt  to increase
revenues. Its  options  were  limited. In 1983,  roughly  40 percent  of recurrent
revenues  were derived  from intergovernmental  transfers,  a source  outside  the
municipality's  control. Effort  was instead  focused  on the  property  tax.
3.06  Rio's  property  tax  reform  had  two  components:  (i)  a  major  resurveying
effort  aimed  at discovering  and  incorporating  recent  construction  onto the  tax
rolls;  and (ii)  an increase  int  valuations,  based  initially  on a steep  increase
in  the  annual  inflation  adjustment,  and  subsequently  the  introduction  of  new  unit
cost factors.
3.07  Prior  to 1984,  Rio's  most recent  general  resurvey  of property  had
been carried  out in 1975.  Products  of the survey  included  orthographically
corrected  maps of the entire  urbanized  area and comprehensive  property  tax
records. Subsequent  maintenance,  however,  was  haphazard. Preliminary  surveys
conducted  in 1984 indicated  that 60,000  recently  constructed  buildings  were
missing  from  the  tax  rolls. Undiscovered  changes  in  use--which  affect  the  tax
i/  Unlike  most Brazillan  municipalitles,  Rio bears exclusive  responslbility
for expenditure  on primary educatlon,  a  legacy  of its former  status  as the
capital  of Brazil.- 14 -
rate-  -were  estimated  to  be  costing  the  municipality  an  amount  equal  to  30  percent
of current  revenues.
3.08  Valuations,  meanwhile,  were  falling  increasingly  behind  market  values.
The  valuations  made in the 1975  general  resurvey  were based  upon market  data
originally  gathered  in 1966,  adjusted  for  inflation. As the  rate  of inflation
increased  in the  early 1980s,  subsequent  adjustments  in  values  failed  to keep
pace.  Between  1984  and  1987,  inflation  totalled  2,900  percent. Adjustments  to
unit costs  were less  than  half that.
3.09  Distortions  were  also  introduced  in  the  distribution  of  the  tax  burden
across  neighborhoods. In 1983,  the municipality  began to differentiate  the
annual increases  by zone and building  size, in an attempt to reduce  the tax
burden  on lower-income  households. Expecting  an inflation  rate  of 200  percent,
the  municipality  capped  the  increase  on  small  residential.  buildings  in  the  north
zone at  50 percent.  Assessments  on large reside-s..  along the southern
beachfront  were  permitted  to  increase  by 280  percent. AP a  result,  by 1987  the
tax  base  not  only  grossly  underestimated  property  values,  but  also  no  longer  even
reflected  the  relative  prices  of properties  in  different  locations.
A.  Resurvey
3.10  The  task of  resurveying  Rio  was  assigned to  the Instituto  de
PlaneJamento  Municipal  (IPLAN).  IPLAN  is  a  m%inicipally-owned  parastatal,  which
assumed  the task  of  maintaining  Rio's  property  tax  cadastre  in 1986.
3.11  From  the  outset,  the  scope  of the  resurvey  was  limited  to  those  areas
and classes of property  where it was expected  to be most cost effective.
Geographically,  its  coverage  was confined  to higher-income  neighborhoods.  The
entire  northern  zone  of the  city--a  low-income  area  encompassing  22 percent  of
taxable  properties  but  only  3  percent  of  the  city's  assessed  value-  -was  excluded.
Favelas--squatter  settlements  in higher-income  areas--were  also explicitly
exempted. Vacant  land  was  also  not  surveyed: no attempt  was  made to  ascertain
changes in parcel boundaries due to subdivision  or consolidation.  IPLAN
anticipated  that the greate3t increase  in assessments  would arise from the
discovery  of new construction  and changes  in building  use.  Thus the program
focused  exclusively  on built-upon  properties.
3.12  The program was carried  out in three phases.  First, the entire
assessment  zone was aerially-photographed.  To minimize  costs,  the resulting
photomosaic  was  not  orthographically  rectified  and transformed  into  line  maps.
Instead,  sections  of the unrectified  photomosaic  itself  were carried  into the
field  and  used  as  base  maps.  In  the  field,  survey  teams  sought  only  three  items
of information  for  each  building  shown  on  the  photomosaic: its  street  address,
number of floors  and its current  use.  No attempt  was made to measure the
physical  dimensions  of the  buildings  or to  determine  their  owners.
3.13  Building  dimensions  were  determined  at the  IPLAN  offices  on the  basis
of the aerial  photographs. The ground-floor  perimeter  of each building  was- 15 -
digitized  and  converted  to  a  uniform  scale  using  a  microcomputer.!1  Based  on  the
corrected  perimeter  dimensions,  a computer  program  then  calculated  the  ground-
floor area of each building.  The total area of multi-story  buildings  was
calculated  by multiplying  the ground  floor  area by the number  of floors,  as
determined  during  the  field  survey.
3.14  Data from the field survey  and floor area calculations  were then
merged  and  compared  with  the  property  records  currently  in  use  by the  assessor.
Tnis revealed  two categories  of discrepancies: (i)  unrecorded  expansions--or
changes  in use--of  buildings  already  on the  assessment  rolls,  and (ii)  newly
constructed  buildings  absent  from  the  assessment  rolls. In  the  former  case,  the
revised data was used to calculate  a new assessment  without further field
investigation.  IPLAN  assumed  that  all  other  information  on  the  property  record-  -
the  construction  characteristics  used  for  valuation,  the  ownership  data  used  for
billing--i.e.,  was  correct.
3.15  In the case of newly constructed  buildings,  the property record
information  had to be acquired.!' IPLAN initially  attempted  to obtain  this
information  through  the  mail: letters  requesting  data  on  ownership  and  building
characteristics  were mailed to the 60,000 new buildings discovered  by the
program. Only 12,000  responses  were  received,  of  which  only  8,400  were  usable.
IPLAN  now intends  to follow  up with a more stridently  worded  mailing  and  will
provide  property  owners  with assistance  in filling  out  data  sheets  through  the
branch  offices  of the  municipal  governments. Where  this fails,  IPLAN  will be
forced  to send  a staff  person  to collect  the  required  data.
B.  Valuation  Reforms
3.16  IPLAN  began  work  on  a  new  calculation  of  unit  costs  in  1986. Uniquely
among  Brazilian  municipalities,  Rio  does  not  value  land  and  buildings  separately
when valuing  built-upon  property. Instead,  a single  factor--value  per square
meter  of built  area--or  "Vu"  is calculated  for  each neighborhood. Individual
valuations  are  derived  by  multiplying  the  floor  area  of  a  building  by the  Vu for
its  neighborhood  and  applying  three  adjustment  'actors  to  reflect  the  building's
age,  its  position  on its  lot  and  the  relative  diesirability  of its  location  within
the  neighborhood.
3.17  To calculate  new Vu's, IPIAN  surveyed  a sample  of 1,200  properties
currently  on the  market. (As  in  the  rest  of Brazil,  official  data  on the  price
of actual  transactions  was  assumed  to be unreliable.) In  middle-  and  higher-
income  areas,  price  information  was  taken  from  newspaper  advertisements.  Follow-
fl/  The scale  of aerial  photographs  will  vary  as the  altitude  of the  plane  and
the  elevation  of the  terrain  being  photographed  change. Standard  micro-computer
software  was  used  to transform  the  digitized  data  to  a  homogeneous  scale. This
process  also requires  the  input  of control  points  at known  distances  from each
other. In  the  Rio  revaluation,  control  points  were  derived  from  orthographically
rectified  maps  prepared  during  the  1975  general  revaluation.
2/  The construction  of a new building  on formerly  vacant  land  was assumed  to
imply  a change  in  ownership.- 16 -
up  calls  were  made  to  determine  the  square  footage  of  the  properties  advertised.
Properties  in low-come  areas  are generally  not advertised  in newspapers. In
these  areas,  price  and floor  area information  was obtained  through  interviews
with the patrons of local bars and bakeries.  Individual  Vu's were then
calculated  for  each sampled  property.
3.18  The weights assigned to the adjustment factors were determined
arbitrarily,  although  they  can dramatically  affect  assessments. A building's
position  at the  back  of  its  lot  can  reduce  its  assessment  by  50  percent;  location
in  a  desirable  part  of  the  neighborhood  can  double  an  assessment.  No effort  was
made to  determine  the  market's  assessment  of the  contribution  of these  factors
to property  values.
C.  Impact  arnd  Cost  Effectiveness,
3.19  IPLAN expects che impact  of the reform to begin to appear  in the
property  tax  receipts  of 1988.  Two of the  components  of the  resurvey  will  be
incorporated  in the 1988 billings:  changes in use and revisions to the
dimensions  of buildings  already  on the  tax rolls. Newly  discovered  buildings
will not be billed in 1988.  As noted earlier,  property  records for these
buildings  are  not  yet  complete.
3.20  Revised  unit costs  will  not  be introduced  until  1989.  For  1988,  the
municipality  has announced  that annual  adjustment  on existing  valuation  will
range from 220 percent to 348 percent for residential  property and  from
220  percent  to 444 percent  for commercial  property.1°1  Nominal  tax rates  are
to  be consolidated  to a single  rate (on  improved  property)  of 0.8  percent.
3.21  The  resurvey  component  of  the  program  has  to  date  cost  the  equivalent
of US$670,000,  an average  of 95 cents  per property. Total  program  costs  were
equivalent  to 1 percent  of property  tax revenues  in the year preceding  the
program.  Viewing the program  as a financial  investment,  IPLAN regards  the
program as highly cost-effective. IPLAN  reports  that one component  alone--
revisions  to  the  records  of  buildings  already  on the  tax  rolls--increased  total
billings  by about  US$15  million,  an amount  equal  to  22  times  the  program's  cost.
3.22  This  apparently  high  degree  of cost  effectiveness  is  attributable  in
part  to the  programs's  narrow  scope. In  excluding  low-income  areas,  it  avoided
properties  where  the  ratio  of  administrative  costs  to  yields  would  be  relatively
high.  In making no attempt to discover changes in parcel dimensions,  it
eliminated  any  need  to  contact  owners  or  investigate  subdivision  records  or  deeds
registrations.
3.23  Costs  were  also  reduced  by the  program's  minimal  reliance  on  original
field data gathering.  By avoiding  any effort to verify ownership,  measure
building  dimensions  or  note  construction  details,  the  field  survey  phase  of the
program  was able  to average  55 buildings  per  field  staff  per  day.
IQ/ Inflation adjustments will continue to be differentiated by neighborhood.- 17 -
3.24  These  cost-cutting  measures  have  some  adverse  consequences.  Existing
omissions  and distortions  in the assessment  rolls of low-income  areas will
clearly  go uncorrected. Missing  vacant  land  parcels  throughout  the  city  will
continue  to  be undiscovered.  The  program's  reliance  on mailings  to  obtain  data
on  new  buildings  has  not  succeeded;  follow-up  efforts  will  increase  the  program's
ultimate  cost. Its  failure  to  verify  ownership  on  existing  built-upon  properties
may result  in  later  collection  problems.





Aerial  photography  166
Digitizer  140
Use  of online  computer  40
Transport  (rented  cars)  35
Misc.  equipment  14
TOTAL  670
3.25  The cost-effectiv--s  of the  program's  technology  choice  is fairly
clear. Alt-housh  oqtLpment  expenditures  total  40  percent  of  total  program  costs,
the  resulting  savings  in labor  costs  appear  to be substantial. The use of a
digitizer  and computer  to correct  scale  distortions  and calculate  floor  areas
permitted  IPLAN  to complete  the  measurement  of an average  of 300  buildings  per
staff  per  day. IPLAN  estimates  that  the  equivalent  rate  using  manual  techniques
would  be about  20 buildings  per staff  day.  At an average  daily  wage of about
US$9,  the  total  costs  (including  both  equipment  and  staff)  of this  phase  of the
program  would  have been  about  50  percent  higher  using  manual  technology.
3.26  IPLAN's  reliance  on  temporary  employees--interns--also  reduced  costs.
As shown  in  Table  2, interns  accounted  for  roughly  90  percent  of the  116  staff
years  consumed  by the  program  and  were  involved  in  every  phase  except  the  initial- 18 -
aerial  photography  (which  was contracted  out).  The use of interns  permitted
IPLAN  to  maintain  relatively  low wage costs--the  program's  total  wage bill
averaged  US$200  per staff  month--while  maintaining  the  flexibility  to release
staff  when the  program  was finish  d.
Table  2: STAFF ALLOCATION
(Man-Years)
Program  Phase  IPLAN  Staff  Interns
Gather  field  data  7.5  52.5
Enter  field  data  on computer  2.5  13.2
Digitize  aerial  photo  data  2.4  11.5
Investigate,  fix  discrepancies  2.0  24.0
Produce  final  list  0.5  na- 19  -
IV.  PROJECT  CIATA
4.01  CIATA,  a  second  major  effort  at  property  tax  reform,  differs  from  the
Rio case in  several  respects. First,  it is a  program  involving  a large  number
of municipalities  rather  than  a  one-time  effort  in a single  city.  Second,  it
is administered  by the federal  government. Third,  it is primarily  aimed  at
smaller  jurisdictions.
4.02  Like the Rio case, CIATA contains some technical  and procedural
innovations  that might be applied in other countries:  the use of simple
identification  and valuation techn*ques,  and the use of computers  in small
jurisdictions. CIATA's  more important  lessons  lie  in the  design  and  execution
of technical assistance  programs,  particularly  in the use of standardized
packages  of technical  assistance  to  reach  large  numbers  of  jurisdictions  at low
cost.
4.03  The CIATA  program  was initiated  by the Federal  Government  in 1973.
It  was  largely a  response to  persistent low  tax  revenues in  smaller
municipalities,  particularly  those  in the  Northeast.
4.04  The Federal  Government  attributed  these low yields  to problems  in
municipal tax laws and weaknesses  in local tax administration. The legal
definition  of value  was inconsistent  with the  methodology  used to derive  it.
Properties  were missing from the tax rolls.  Valuations  were arbitrary.
Procedures  for  monitoring  collections  were ineffective.
4.05  The  Government's  response was  to establish a  major program of
technical assistance, terme4 CIATA.UI  CIATA consists essentially  of  a
standardized  package  of technical  assistance  executed  over a 1-year  period  in
a  designated  group of municipalities. Within  each municipality,  the program
produces:
(a)  a new  tax  code;
(b)  a new fiscal  cadastre--incorporating  revised  maps,  new property
records,  a  new  table  of  unit  costs  and  revised  assessments  on  all
properties--and
(c)  a set  of  billing  records  (the  tax  roll  and  individual  tax  bills)
to  be used in the  first  year following  the  project.
4.06  Since  1973,  CIATA  projects  have  been  completed  in  1,282
municipalities.  As shown  in  Table  3,  the  program  has  averaged  about  100  projects
per  year.  Most  have  been small. The  number  of property  units  per  project  has
averaged  6,440.
1/  Convenio de Incentivo ao Aperfecicoamento  Tecnico-Administrativo  das
Munlc.palldades.- 20 -
Table  3: CIATA  PROJECTS  1973-85
Average  Units
Year  Projects  per  Project
1973  9  4,517
1974  11  5,572
1975/76  49  6,759
1977  81  8,945
1978  128  9,726
1979  193  7,113
1980  106  7,176
1981  163  3,682
1982/83  214  3,409
1984  174  3,588
1985  152  11,480
TOTAL  1,282  8,256,251
Average  99  6,440
A.  Organization
4.07  The  program  is  administered  by the  Secretaria  de  Economia  e  Financas,
(SEF)  a unit of the Federal  Ministry  of Finance.  SEF's role is limited  to
overall  program  management  and the  provision  of financing. Field  supervision
of individual  projects  is carried  out by a permanent  CIATA team working in
SERPRO,  the  federal  government's  data-processing  parastatal. SERPRO  provides
this  service  on a contract  basis  to SEF.
4.08  Individual  subprojects  draw  on five  categories  of inputs:
(a)  the  project  supervisor,  assigned  by SERPRO,  who remains  on-site
throughout  project  implementation;
(b)  temporary staff  (used in  field data collection) surveying,
cartography,  and the  preparation  of forms  for  data  processing;
(c)  materials and  equipment, including forms and  equipment for
surveying  and  mapping;
(d)  data processing  services,  including  entry of field data onto
computer  files,  calculation  of assessments,  production  of tax
rolls,  and  printing  of tax  bills;  and- 21 -
(e)  in-kind  contributions  by the  municipality,  including  the use of
office  space  and  the  services  of  the  local  assessor  and  his  staff.
4.09  The number  of inputs  that  SEF is willing  to finance  has diminished
as the  program  has  matured. As shown  in  Table  4, CIATA  originally  financed  all
project  inputs  except  in-kind  contributions  by the  municipality. Beginning  in
1976,  SEF  shifted  the  costs  of data  processing  to the  states  and  municipalities
(as  mutually  agreed  on an individual  project  basis). In 1981,  SEF  also  ceased
to finance  the cost of temporary  staff.  At present,  the program therefore
finances  only  the  costs  of the  project  supervisor,  and  materials  and  equipment.
Costs of  temporary staff are  borne by  the municipality;  costs of  data
processing,  by the  state  or  municipality.  All SEF-financed  inputs  are  financed
on a grant  basis.
Table  4:  FINANCING  OF PROJECT  INPUTS/a
INPUT  1973-75  1976-80  1981-87
Supervisor  SEF  SEF  SEF
Temporary  Staff  SEF  SEF  MUN
Materials  and  Equipment  SEF  HUN/STATE  MUN/STATE
Data Processing  SEF  HUN/STATE  HUN/STATE
Office,  Local  Assessor  MUN  MUN  MUN
/A  Agency  providing  funding  for  project  inputs:
SEF:  Secretaria  de  Economia  e  Financas  (Federal  Government);
HUN:  Municipalities;
STATE: State  Government.
B.  Seguence
4.10  With a given  municipality,  the  CIATA  process  is comprised  of eight
principal  steps.
Nominati2n
4.11  Candidates  for inclusion  in the  program  are initially  nominated  by
their  respective  state  governments  under  guidelines  fixed  by SEF. A final  list
of nominees is then agreed  upon in discussions  between SEF and the state
government.- 22 -
Contracting
4.12  Two acts are then required  of the municipal  government  before its
formal  inclusion  in the  project. First,  the  municipal eotnscil  must enact--and
the mayor execute--a  revised  municipal  tax code based upon a model provided
under the program.  Second,  the council  must approve--and  the  mayor sign--a
project  agreement  with its respective  state  government  and SEF.  The project
agreement  specifies  the  municipality's  obligations  with  respect  to the  provision
of financial and in-kind contributions  to the project, the administrative
relationships  between the project and the various  agencies  of the municipal
government,  and any specific  procedural  reforms  that might be required  as a
condition  of inclusion  in the  project.
Mobilization
4.13  Mobilization  begins  with  the  arrival  of the  SERPRO  supervisor  on  site.
The supervisor then recrtits temporary  staff, organizes office space and
procures  materials  and  equipment. The  temporary  staff  used in the  project  are
normally  hired locally  and given  a 5-day  training  course.  121  CIATA  generally
prefers  to  hire  staff  with less-than-university-level  educations  on the  grounds
that  university  graduates  are  more  adept  at  outwitting  verification  procedures.
Preparation  of Reference  MaR
4.14  Prior  to  beginning  field  work,  an initial  reference  map is  prepared.
The  map, showing  only  street  boundaries  and  other  major  geographical  features,
is used to organize  subsequent  field  work and to provide the base for more
detailed  block maps.  The initial  map is assembled  from existing  parcellary
maps,  subdivision  plans,  and road and  utility  maps.  Once the temporary  staff
has  been  recruited, survey teams then go  to  the  field to verify this
information,  and  sketch and measure streets not  identified  from existing
sources. These  are  then  incorporated  on the  reference  map.  The  reference  map,
prepared  at  a scale  of  1:5,000  is  then  divided  into  sections,  which  are  expanded
to  a scale  of 1:1,000  and  printed  on separate  sheets.
Field  Work
4.15  Property Identification:  This phase of the field  work has two
objectives.  The first  is  to identify  each  property  and  assign  it  an assessment
number. For  this  purpose,  the  survey  team  determines  only  the  boundaries  of  the
front  footage  of each lot.  Boundary  points  are  sketched  on the section  maps,
and  an assessment  number  is  assigned  to each  segment  of frontage.
4.16  ProRerty  Characteristics:  The  second  objective  is to  gather  data  on
property  characteristics,  to be subsequently  used in calculating  individual
property  valuations.  The characteristics  of each property  are coded on a
standard  record  (see  Annex 1).  The record  lists:  (i) the assessment  number
IV  Their  fLeldwork  Ls  verified  by  having  a sample  of blocks  rechecked. CIATA
also  uses  a  template  to  check  property  records  for  Implausibilities  (for  example,
a thatched  roof  on a building  reported  to  have  floors  of cera4ic  tile).- 23 -
and  address  of  the  property;  (ii)  the  name  and  address  of the  owner  or claimant;
(iii)  data  on the  physical  characteristics  of the  lot (approximate  dimensions,
steepness,  susceptibility  to flooding);  and (iv)  data on the current  use and
physical  characteristics  of  the  structures  (approximate  exterior  dimensions,  and
details  of external  and interior  building  materials,  plumbing  and  wiring).
Calculation  of Unit Costs
4.17  New  unit  cost tables  for  land  and  buildings  are  then  calculated. As
is common in Brazil,  estimates  of the  unit value of land are determined  for
different  neighborhoods  by a committee,  appointed  by the  mayor,  of landowners
and  real  estate  agents. These  committees  do  not  use  evidence  from  actual  market
transaction  data in any systematic  way, but instead rely on their general
knowledge  of the  local  real  estate  market. Unit costs  for  buildings  are  based
on data published  in the Brazilian  trade  journal  "Revlsta  de  Construcao,"  as
modified  by the  CIATA  project  supervisor.  Depreciation  tables  are  also  prepared
by the  project  supervisor.
Preparation  of Assessment  Roll
4.18  Individual  property  valuations  are calculated  by applying  the unit
cost tables  to the characteristics  of each  property. A trial  assessment  roll
is then  prepared  for the  consideration  of the  mayor.  The  mayor may, at this
time,  modify  either  the  unit cost tables  or individual  valuations  as he deems
appropriate.  (Mayors  generally  exercise this option.)  Once the mayor is
satisfied, a  final  assessment roll  is  prepared, listing properties by
identification  number.
Printing  of bills
4.19  Based  on the  assessment  roll  approved  by the  mayor,  the  nominal  tax
rate  and any subsequent  inflation  adjustments  authorized  by the  municipality,
individual  property  tax  bills  are  then  printed  and  turned  over  to the  municipal
treasurer  for  delivery. Where  records  are  processed  manually  or  in  batch,  CIATA
will  also  produce  a tax  roll  with  space  to  record  payments  against  each  account.
C.  Duration.  Technology  and Scope
4.20  CIATA  administrators  estimate  the  duration  of  a typical  project,  from
mobilization  to the  printing  of  bills--at  about  five  mouths--in  a municipality
of 5,000  property  units.  In a  municipality  of 3,000,  a project  normally  takes
three  months.  At the peak of data gathering,  survey  teams  working in pairs
average  15  property  units  per day.  The  scope  and  duration  of individual  CIATA
projects  will, however,  vary according  to preproject  conditions. If existing
reference  maps are ade.quate,  new ones will not be prepared.  If existing
property  records  are  reliable,  the  data-gather  phase  will be relatively  short.
4.21  CIATA's use  of computers has  evolved with changes in computer
technology.  Early  CIATA  projects  were  designed  to  be administered  manually,  or
in batch on mainframe computers at SERPRO's central computer facilities.- 24 -
Reliance  on  centralized  computers  proved  cumbersome,  as  property  records  had  to
be shipped  over long  distances. This  particularly  limited  the  use of CIATA's
post-project  data  processing  services  for  updating  tax  rolls  and  issuing  annual
bills.  The advent  of mini-  and  micro-computer  technology  has permitted  CIATA
to  decentralize  data  processing.  In larger  jurisdictions,  CIATA  now  encourages
municipalities  to purchase  their own computers.  Smaller  jurisdictions  are
encouraged  to share regional  computers,  through individual  terminals  linked
through  telephone  lines.
4.22  The decentralization  of data  processing  has enabled  CIATA  to  expand
in scope.  Under the earlier,  centralized  mainframe  technology,  the use of
computers  to  record  payments  and  monitor  collection  enforcement  was  impractical.
The increasing  availability  of computers  at the municipal  level  has made the
computerization  of treasury  operations  technically  feasible,  and  corresponding
technical  assistance  components  are  now  made  available  under  the  CIATA  program.
D.  Impact
4.23  CIATA's  principal  objective  is to produce  a comprehensive  valuation
of the  tax  base  in  each  project  municipality.  In  general,  a  CIATA  project  would
be expected  to increase  the aggregate  value of the tax base.  Two separate
sources  of growth  can  be distinguished.  First,  a  project  would  be expected  to
increase  the  number of properties  on the tax rolls through  the discovery  of
mi  ;sing  properties  and expansion  of the zone subject to property taxation.
Se.ond, it would  increase average valuations by  producing more accurate
information  on the  physical  characteristics  of each  property  and  by employing
more recent  market data to convert  property  characteristics  to estimates  of
value.
4.24  CIATA  clearly  has  the  former  impact. CIATA  projects  consistently  and
substantially  increase  the  number  of  properties  on the  tax  rolls. The  evidence
from a representative  sample  of CIATA  projects  is summarized  in Tables  5A and
5B.  The tables  show  the  results  of 241  projects  in four  project  years:  1977,
1978, 1983 and 1984.31  For purposes  of comparability,  projects  are divided
between  those  in the  less  industrialized  North/Northeast  and those  in  the  rest
of Brazil  (termed  "south"  in the  following  tables).
Projects  in 1977  and 1978
4.25  As shown  in the  first  row  of  Table  5A,  CIATA  projects  undertaken  in
1977  and 1978  in northern  Brazil  increased  the  number  of properties  on the  tax
rolls  by an average  of 25 percent.  In southern  Brazil,  the impact  was even
greater. Projects  in 1977  doubled  the  number  of  properties  on the  rolls;  those
in 1978 increased  the  number  of properties  by about  50  percent.
DJ  Figures  for  1977  and  1978  projects  are  based  on  100  percent  of  observations;
figures  for  1983  and  1984,  on  a  33  percent  sample. Figures  for  each  project  are
listed  In Annex  3.- 25 -
Table  SA:  RESULTS  OF PROJECTS  IN 1977  AND 1978
1977  1978
Indicator  North  South  North  South
Percent  change  in  units  26  94  24  51
Revenues  per  unit (US$)
preproject  2.97  8.11  4.69  12.46
postproject  4.53  7.47  4.78  12.58
Percent  change  in revenue
project  93  78  27  52
control  42  20  29  42
Xa  Constant  US$ of preproject  year.
jJb  In real  Terms
Lc  Control  Group  consists  of all  municipalities  except  state
capitals  in respective  region.
4.26  CIATA's  impact  on  valuations  is  more  difficult  to document. Project
documents  do  not  identify  the  level  of  preproject  valuations.  The  analysis  must
therefore  be based  on a comparison  of revenues. This is liable  to two  sources
of  distortion.  First,  a  municipal  government  may  elect  to  counteract  the  effect
of increased  valuations  by lowering  the  nominal  tax  rate (or,  as is  more likely
in  Brazil,  adjusting  valuations  at less  than  the  rate  of inflation).  This  would
decrease  the  level  of  billings  per  property  unit.  Second,  collection  efficiency-
-the  proportion  of billings  actually  collected--may  decline. Taken  together,
a lower  tax rate  and a decline  in collection  efficiency  may cancel  the  effect
on tax  revenues  of an increase  in  valuations.W1
4.27  This,  in fact,  appears  to be occurring  in  most CIATA  projects. The
second  and  third  rows  of Table  5A  compare  revenues  per  property  unit  before  and
after CIATA projects.  Among the groups  of municipalities  on which data are
available,  only one--northern  projects  in 1977--show  a dramatic  increase  in
revenues  per  unit.  In  real  terms,  revenues  per  unit in  this  group  increased  by
an  average  of  53  percent. Among  the  other  groups--the  northern  projects  in  1978
and the southern  projects in both 1977 and 1978--revenues  per unit either
increased  only slightly  or declined.
[4  A third  factor  may  also influence  the  project's  impact  on tax  revenues.  If
the  average  value  of  newly  discoverad  propertles  Is less  than  the  average  value
of  properties  already  on the  tax  rolls,  the  project  would  result  in an overall
decline  In  average  valuations.- 26 -
4.28  The magnitude  of the impact  of each of these  offsetting  factors  is
unclear. Both tax  rates--in  the form  of inflation  adjustments--and  collection
efficiency  are  volatile  enough  that  either  could  offset  a substantial  increase
in valuations.  Anecdotal  evidence suggests  that valuations  themselves  may
incorporate  a pre-emptive  reduction  in effective  tax rates:  CIATA officials
report  that the  unit costs  on which  valuations  are based are  often far  below
market  prices.
4.29  The net effect  of CIATA  projects  on tax revenues  is shown in the
fourth  row  of Table  5A.  Not surprisingly,  the  rate  of increase  in revenues  is
generally  proportional  to the rate of increase  in property  units.  In the
northern  projects  in 1978,  real  revenues  increased  by an average  of 27 percent
(compared  to  a  24  percent  increase  in  property  units). In  the  southern  projects
in 1977 and 1978,  real revenues  increased  by an average  of 78 percent  and 52
percent,  respectively  (compared  to increases  of 94 percent  and 51 percent in
property  units  in  each group  of projects). Only in the  northern  1977  projects
did  revenues  increase  at a  higher  rate  than  property  units. Among  this  group,
revenues  increase  93  percent  in real  terms;  property  units,  26  percent.
Projects  in 1983  and 1984
4.30  In the more recent  groups  of projects--1983  and 1984--tax  revenues
generally  declined  in  real  terms  following  project  implementation.  As shown  in
Table  5B,  real  revenues  declined  by 50-55  percent  in  the  northern  CIATA  projects.
Results  were better in the south.  There,  the 1983 projects  averaged  a real
decline in revenue  of only 5 percent;  1984 projects  experienced  an average
increase  in revenues  of 18 percent.
4.31  Data  on the  number  of preproject  property  units  is  not available  for
this  group  of projects. In assessing  the  determinants  of this  performance,  it
is therefore  impossible  to distinguish  the effect  of changes  in the  number  of
property  units  from the combined  effect  of changing  valuations,  tax rates  and
collection  efficiency.
4.32  The  performance  of  the  1983  and  1984  CIATA  municipalities  is,  however,
consistent  with the performance  of the  property  tax throughout  Brazil  during
this  period. As noted  earlier,  the  early  1980s  was a period  of recession  and
rapid inflation  in Brazil.  Property  tax revenues  in the country  as a whole
declined  at an average  annual  rate of 34 percent  between 1980  and 1984.  The
performance  of  CIATA  municipalities  relative  to  the  general  trend  is  mixed. The
"control"  rows in Table 5B compare  the  revenue  performance  of CIATA  projects
with  that  of  a  comparable  group  of  non-CIATA  municipalities.  As shown,  property
tax  revenues  declined  in  real  terms  in  all  the  control  groups  over  the  relevant
period. The  rate  of  decline  in CIATA  projects  in the  north  was  greater  than  in
control  groups: revenues  in  project  municipalities  declined  by 49 percent  and
55 percent  in the  1983  and 1984  groups,  respectively,  against  a decline  of 15
percent  and  8 percent  in the  corresponding  control  groups.  In the south,  the
reverse  occurred.  Property  tax revenues  in the 1983 project  municipalities
declined by 5 percent (against  a  control performance  of  -22 percent) and
increased  by 18 percent in 1984 projects  (against  a control  performance  of
-4  percent).- 27 -
Table  SB:  RESULTS  OF PROJECTS  IN 1983  AND 1984
1983  1984
Indicator  North  South  North  South
Revenues  per  unit (US$)
postproject  0.87  4.61  2.48  2.57
Percent  change  in reveiNue
project  -49  -5  -55  +18
control  -15  -22  -8  -4
E  Costs
4.33  The total  cost of a typical  CIATA  project  is estimated  to average
US$6.50 per property  unit.  This figure includes  the costs of the project
supervisor,  materials  and equipment,  data processing  and temporary  staff.5 1
As  shown in Table 6, management,  materials and equipment  account for the
majority  of  costs--roughly  US$5.50  per  property  unit.  Data  processing  averages
50 cents  per  property  unit;  temporary  staff,  an equivalent  amount.
4.34  These  costs are fairly  high when compared  to the level  of property
tax revenues.  When combined  with the recurrent  cost of administering  the
property  tax--estimated  at US$1.55  per property  unit>/ 1--administrative  costs
would consume  most of the revenue  generated  by the property  tax for several
years  following  project  completion.  Among  northern  projects  completed  in  1977,
for  example,  only 64 percent  would  be generating  a positive  cash  flow
Z.5/  Costs of data processing  are based on processlng  In batch at a CIATA
regional  office.
/  The estimates  of recurrent  costs Include  the salaries  of the municipal
assessor,  20 percent of the municipal treasurer's  salary, CIATA's  recurrent
maLntenance  charge  and  postage. Together  these  recurrent  costs  average  US$1.55
per  property.- 28 -
Table  6: CIATA  PROJECT  COSTS
(US$)
Typical  Per  Percent
Component  Project  Property  of Total
Supervisor,  materials  27,500  5.50  85
Data  processing  2,500  0.50  8
Temp.  staff  2,500  0.50  8
TOTAL  32,500  6.50  100
after three  years;  of those  completed  in 1978,  only 37 percent  would show a
positive  cash flow  after  three  years.  The  breakeven  point  arrives  earlier  in
southern  projects,  where average  revenues  are  higher:  roughly  95 percent  of
projects  would  generate  a positive  cash flow after  three  years.  The 1983  and
1984 southern projects show pay back periods similar to earlier northern
projects,  however. Only  38  percent  of southern  projects  completed  in 1983,  and
only 29 percent  of projects  completed  in 1984,  break even after  three  years.
(The equivalent  figures  for northern  projects  are 0 percent and 5 percent,
respectively.) As discussed  in the  concluding  section,  these  results  suggest
the  need for  greater  selectivity  in  the  choice  of  participating  municipalities.- 29 -
V.  GENERALIZABLE  LESSONS
5.01  Brazil's  experience  with  urban  property  taxation  yields  generalizable
lessons  on both the  practice  of property  tax  administrationi  and  the  process  of
implementing  administrative  reforms.
A.  ImDroving  Administrative  Procedures
5.02  Virtually  all  developing  countries  present  a  similar  set  of  challenges
to  the  administration  of the  property  tax. The  effectiveness  of  administrative
procedures  in  responding  to these  problems  determines  how  well the  property  tax
performs.  (For  a summary  of these  common  problems,  and Brazil's  response  to
them,  see  Box  2.)
SUMMARY  OF PROCEDURAL  SOLUTIONS
i  Proble  Brazilian  ResRonse
Rapid  urban  growth  - Cross-referencing
- Voluntary  compliance
- Ongoing  field  surveys
- Episodic  general  surveys
Scarce  skills  - Simple  valuation  method
- CIATA  technical  assistance
Inaccessible  market  data  - Use  of construction  data
- Land  value  "commissions"
Inflation  - Indexed  valuations
Disputed  liability  - Broad  definition  of liability
Slow  judicial  processes  - Tax clearances
Box 2
Rapid  Urban  Growth
5.03  In  a rapidly  growing  city,  a one-time  survey  of parcels  and  property
characteristics  is  obsolete  as  soon  as  it is  completed.  Property  tax  procedures
must  be capable  of discovering  and  incorporating  new  construction  onto  the  tax
rolls  on an ongoing  basis.
5.04  In Brazil,  municipalities  employ  four techniques  to obtain  updated
information on  property  characteristics:  cross-referencing,  voluntary
compliance,  ongoing field surveys  and episodic  general resurveys.  The tax-
clearance form of cross-referencing  appears to be effective  up-ier  certain- 30  -
conditions: when imposed  as a condition  of granting  an occupancy  permit  (to
flag new construction)  or registering  a deed of sale (to flag changes in
ownership,  including  new  subdivisions).  It  would  presumably  be as  effective  in
other countries,  provided  the process of property  transfer  and development
employed  similar  systems  of approval  and registration. Cross-referencing,  in
the form of voluntary  information-sharing  amoni,  agencies  of government,  does
not  have a good track  record  in  Brazil. Experience  with voluntary  compliance
is  similarly  mixed.
5.05  Episodic  general  resurveys,  as practiced  in Brazil,  are a response
to the  failure  of  other  techniques  to  provide  updated  property  information.  As
a maintenance  technique,  they imply  the acceptance  of a high level  of evasion
prior  to  the  general  resurvey. Rio's  experience  suggests  that  general  resurveys
can  be undertaken  at relatively  low  unit-cost,  but  at the  expense  of continued
omissions  and distortions  in the tax  base.  CIUTA's  experience  suggests  that
comprehensive  general  resurveys  are  not  cost-effective  if they  are  relied  upon
as the  sole  method  of obtaining  updated  property  information.
Scarcity  of Skills
5.06  The  task  of  converting  visible  property  characteristics  to  an  estimate
of market  value is one that  potentially  requires  a sophisticated  knowledge  of
property  markets and leaves  considerable  discretion  to individual  property
valuers.  Local governments  in many developing  countries  have difficulty
attracting  such  staff  and  have found  that  discretion  invites  corruption.
5.07  Brazil's  response  is  to  use  a  highly  simplified  form  of  mass  appraisal
to derive the majority of property valuations.  In this respect, it is
successful. The technique  is  based  upon a few  readily  observable,  measurable
characteristics  of each  property. No skills,  other  than  the  ability  to  measure
and write, are required  of the valuer in the field.  His work is readily
verifiable  through  remeasurement  of randomly  selected  properties.
5.08  The  technique  does  require  a degree  of professional  judgement  in the
initial  calculation  of unit costs.  Here, CIATA appears  to be a successful
response,  particularly  in  smaller  jurisdictions  where  the  need  is  most  critical.
CIATA maintains a  centralized  pool  of expertise, which  is available to
municipalities  at the  time  unit  costs  are  recalculated.
Inaccessible  Market  Information
5.09  Accurate  data on market  prices  are also  essential  to the  production
of defensible  valuations. They  are  rarely  available  through  official  sources.
In  countries  defining  value  in  capital  or sales  terms,  data  on transactions  are
understated  to avoid  real estate  transfer  taxes.  In countries  defining  value
in  rental  terms,  a similar  problem  exists. Many of these  countries  impose  rent
controls. As these  controls  are  often  ignored  or subverted  in  the  market,  data
on actual--and  therefore  illegal--rents  are  not available  to  official  sources.
5.10  Brazil  has a workable  approach  to the  calculation  of unit costs  for
buildings: the  municipalities  use  construction  cost  data  derived  from  industry
sources. Brazil  has  not  found  an acceptable  means  of calculating  the  unit  cost- 31 -
of land. While  the  required  knowledge  may  reside  with  real  estate  brokers,  their
prasence  on  valuation  commissions  does  not  bring  it  to  the  fore. Land  therefore
continues  to  be arbitrarily  valued  in  Brazil.
Inflation
5.11  In  any  country  with  significant  inflation,  existing  valuations  rapidly
become  obsolete,  along  with the  unit  costs  used to  value  new construction.  The
buoyancy of tax revenues cannot  be maintained  without regularly adjusting
valuations  and  unit costs  or compensatory  increases  in the  nominal  tax  rate.
5.12  Brazil  has  coped  successfully  with  inflation.  This  success  is  largely
attributable  to the federal  legislation  which permits  municipalities  to make
annual  adjustments  in  valuations  without  physical  reinspections  of  properties.
The recent instability  in inflation  rates has proven more challenging,  as
municipalities  generally  calculate  tax  liabilities  in nominal  terms  before  the
beginning  of the tax  year,  and  taxpayers  are  permitted  to pay in installments.
Rio's  decision  to assess  taxes  in terms  of treasury  bill units  appears  to  be a
successful,  though  cumbersome,  response  to this  problem.
Disputed  Liability
5.13  Collection  enforcement  depends  upon the ability  of government  to
identify  the  person  liable  for  paying  the tax.  While  property  is  visible  and
easily  defined,  tax  liability  is  not. Records  of  ownership  or  tenancy  agreements
may  be inaccessible  to the  taxing  authority. If liability  is  narrowly  defined
and  the  burden  of  proving  liability  is  placed  on  the  taxing  authority,  collection
enforcement  is  made  unnecessarily  difficult.
5.14  Brazil  defines  liability  as  ownership,  but  defines  ownership  broadly.
Liability  effectively  extends  to any person in beneficial  occupation  of the
property.  In  employing this broad  definition, the  municipalities are
successfully  relieved  of any legal  obligation  to  prove legal  ownership  before
imposing  the  tax.
Slow  and Expensive  Judicial  Processes
5.15  Enforcement  also depends upon the government's  ability to impose
penalties  swiftly  and  consistently.  The  judicial  processes  for  collecting  civil
debts are often slow and expensive  in deve'oping  countries.  Administrative
enforcement  mechanisms  can  exploit  the  government's  role  as  a  provider  of  public
services,  granter  of  permits  and  recorder  or guarantor  of property  ownership  to
give  the  taxing  authority  lev  rage  over  delinquent  taxpayers.
5.16  Collection  enforcement  in  Brazil  continues  to  be  a  problem. Brazilian
municipalities  have attempted  to  use  a variety  of administrative  mechanisms  to
enforcc,  collections.  Only one--a tax clearance for deed registration--is
consis  ently  effective,  and  its  use  is  limited: taxpayers  who  have  no intention
of transferring  titles  are  unaffected.- 32 -
B.  Lessons  for  the  Design  of Technical  Assistance  Programs
5.17  Brazil's  experience  in  attempting  to  improve  property  tax
administration--exemplified  by  the  CIATA  and  Rio  cases--yields several
generalizable  lessons.
Method  of Delivery
5.18  CIATA's  method  of  delivery  is  clearly  an  effective  means  of  providing
technical  assistance  on a  mass  scale. Three  characteristics  of the  program  are
critical  in this  respect:
*  Prepackaging:  CIATA  is  delivered  as  a standardized  package. The
program  provtdes  proforma  bylaws,  forms  and  procedures  manuals  and
follows  essentially  the same sequence  of steps in each project
municipality.  As a  result,  no time  is  lost  reinventing  available
materials,  and  new  projects  can  benefit  from  the  experience  gained
in  previous  projects.
- Permanent  staff: The  use  of a  permanent  CIATA  staff  ensures  that
projects  are  directed  by experienced  managers  who,  again,  benefit
from  experience  gained  in  prior  projects.
*  Collaborative  roles  for CIATA and local  staff:  CIATA  provides
its technical  assistance  in the form of a project  manager  who
directs the  implementation  of  projects using  staff of  the
assessor's  office  and locally  hired interns. This approach  is
clearly  more  effective  than  the  alternative  methods  of  delivering
technical  assistance.  The  diagnostic/prescriptive  mode--yielding
recommendations  to be executed  by the municipality--would  not
exploit  the implementation  experience  of prior CIATA projects.
The execution  mode--where  projects  would  be executed  entirely  by
CIATA  staff  with  the  finished  product  (maps,  property  records,  and
bills)  turned  over  to the  municipality  on completion--would  have
little  chance  of  achieving  a  sustained  impact. Direct  involvement
of  the assessor appears to be  critical to the  transfer of
knowledge  needed  to  maintain  the  system.
ScoRe
5.19  While  CIATA  consistently  results  in  an increase  in  total  valuations,
its  impact  on  actual  revenues  is  mixed. Increases  in  valuations  are  often  offset
by reductions  in  effective  tax  rates  or  by declining  collection  efficiency.  Even
where tax revenues  rise substantially,  the absolute  level of property  taxes
remains  low.
5.20  It can be argued  that CIATA's  failure  to increase  tax revenues  is
partly  due  to  its  narrow  scope. The  program's  original  objective  was to  produce
a comprehensive  valuation  of the  tax  base.  Until  recently,  it  did  not  address
collection  procedures  (though  this  has si..ce  been remedied  by the  inclusion  of
a collection  monitoring  component  in the  project).- 33 -
5.21  A too narrow  scope,  however,  only partly  explains  CIATA's limited
impact. Anecdotal  evidence  suggests  that  declining  collection  enforcement  was
an intentional  response  to subsequent  political  pressure. And reductions  in
effective  tax  rates--another  cause  of  CIATA's  limited  impact  on  revenues-  -clearly
reflects  deliberate  policy.
Changing  Political  Incentives?
5.22  The tendency  of local officials  to counteract  CIATA's impact on
valuations  reflects  the  political  incentives  governing  the  use of the  property
tax  in  Brazil. As described  earlier,  formula-based  intergovernmental  transfers
are the primary  source  of municipal  revenue  in Brazil.  The 10 shared  taxes
effectively finance a  minimum  level  of  municipal expenditure in  each
jurisdiction. The role of the  property  tax in financing  local  government  is
limited: along  with  a local  services  tax,  it  serves  only  as a  means  of  enabling
local governments  to make marginal increases in municipal expenditure  in
accordance  with local  preferences.
5.23  Judging  from  the  level  of  property  taxation  in  Brazil,  taxpayers  have
not  expressed  a preference  for increasing  the  level  of municipal  expenditure--
at least  if it requires  an increase  in local  taxes. This  presumably  reflects
some  scepticism  over  the  value-for-money  generated  by municipal  expenditure.  It
also reflects  a recognition  that alternative  external  sources  of funds are
available.  Due  to  the  ambiguous  division  of  functions  among  levels  of  government
in Brazil,  ad hoc support,  in cash or kind, can  be sought  from the  state  and
central  governments.
5.24  Should the structure  of intergovernmental  transfers  be changed to
encourage  increases in local taxation?  Not necessarily.  A high level of
municipal  expenditure  is  not  an  end  in  itself. If  the  existing  level  of  property
taxation  in fact reflects  taxpayers'  assessment  of the merits  of additional
municipal  expenditure,  Government  should  not  attempt  to distort  it.
5.25  There is, however,  a case for removing  any existing  disincentives
against  local  taxation  and  providing  taxpayers  with an unbiased  basis  on which
to judge the case for an increase  in local expenditure. One step in this
direction  would  be  to  define  the  functional  responsibilities  of  local  governments
more  precisely  in  order  to  establish  more  clearly  the  link  between  the  level  of
local  taxes  and  the  output  of local  government.
Selection  Criteria
5.26  Should  CIATA  projects  be discontinued  in jurisdictions  unwilling  to
make complementary  changes in tax policy?  Again, not necessarily.  CIATA's
limited  revenue  impact  does  not  negate  the  case for the  program.  It succeeds
in improving the fairness with which the burden of the property tax is
distributed  even  if it  does  not  necessarily  result  in an increase  in revenues.
But it raises a final issue for the design  on such programs:  under what
circumstances  are  investments  in improved  tax  administration  worth  undertaking?- 34
5.27  The  question  is  difficult  to  answer  in  precise  terms. While  the  costs
of  such  programs  are  readily  quantified,  the  benefits  are  not. There  are  several
reasons.
5.28  First, the benefits of an  increase  in fairness alone cannot be
quantified  in any  meaningful  way.
5.29  Second, the benefits  of an increase  in tax revenues  can only be
approximated.  Revenues  Liemselves  are  a poor  proxy  for  benefits: as taxes  are
merely  a transfer  of resources  from  the  private  to the  public  sector,  the  gain
in  benefits  from  increased  public  expenditure  must  be offset--wholly  or  partly-
-by  the  loss  in  benefits  from  reduced  private  expenditure. It is  only  this  net
benefit  that  must  justify  the  costs  of tax  administration.
5.30  Finally, the  causal relationship  between an  improvement  in tax
administration  and  increases in revenue is complex.  The quality of  tax
administration  clearly  affects  the  level  of  revenues  generated  from  a  particular
tax.  Any effort to increase  the tax rate on a badly administered  tax base
exaggerates  existing  inequities  and  carries  potentially  adverse  political  costs.
But  as  the  CIATA  case  illustrates,  a  given  increase  in  property  discoveries  does
not  necessarily  generate  an equivalent  increase  in revenues.
5.31  It  is  clear,  nevertheless  that  tax  administration  projects  should  not
be undertaken  where they  would  be unprofitable,  in financial  terms,  from the
perspective  of the  public  sector  as  a  whole. A tax  whose  revenues  do not  exceed
its administrative  costs  generates  no net revenues  and therefore  generates  no
benefits. Government  resources  shouild  not  be invested  in  projects  which  do not
generate  benefits.
5.32  Profitability,  however,  represents  a subminimum  standard. A tax  that
breaks  even  from  a financial  standpoint  is still  a money-losing  proposition  in
economic  terms. If  a tax's  administrative  costs  consume  too  large  a  proportion
of its  gross  revenues  in  a large  number  of  municipalities,"l  then  consideration
should  be given  to  altering  the  system  of local  finance  as a  whole. Brazil  for
example  might  consider  abolishing  either  the  property  tax  or the  services  tax.
Both perform  an identical  role:  that  of permitting  local  discretion  over the
level  of  municipal  expenditure.  A single  tax  instrument  can  do the  job  equally
well,  while  eliminating  the  costs  of administering  the  second  tax.
J/  This Is  often  expressed  In terms  of an  administrative  cost  ratLo,  measured
as the  ratio  of administrative  cost to  gross  revenues. An administrative  cost
ratio of 100 percent  would represent,  In financial  terms,  a tax's  breakeven
point.  While the  standard  for administrative  cost  ratios  varles  among taxes,
ratlos  of less  than 10 percent  may be considered  an appropriate  target.  The
typical  administrative  cost  ratLo  for  the  property  tax  In the  United  States,  for
example,  averages  about  1  percent  (excluding  costs  of billlng).- 35  -
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WlUICIPIO  STAT  CHANGE  REVENUES  PER  UMIT  PERCENT  CHARE  !3 REVENUES
Projects  in  1977  UNITS  PRE-PROJ  PRWECT  PROECT  PLUS  5 YEARS
JACIARA  1T  1  51.17  $1.79  541  7X
ARSALHA  CE  S01  57.79  S7.24  40*  -291
BREJO  SANTO  CE
CRATO  CE  31  82.34  510.34  3551  -351
ICO  CE  211  S4.S6  84.73  261  -241
IPU  CE  191  51.48  S3.02  1461  -191
JOAZEIRO  00 N. CE  241  81.49  53.77  2151  -301
NORAOA  NOVA  CE  191  51.26  U3.03  1841  -231
SAO  SENEDITO  CE  901  S0.68  S5.26  13801  -271
UWARA  CE  481  S0.79  SS.24  6771  -265
VICOSA  00 CEARA  CE
AGUA  NANCA  PI
lATALHA  PI  1668  55.45  53.73  841  -26X
CASTELO  Of PIAUI
ESPARANTINA  PI  -15  50.98  53.66  2361  -351
ELES8AO  VELOSO  PI  01  50.41  51.SS  2791  -621
JOSE  O£  FREITAS  PI  -21  SLI8  53.15  1341  -211
PEOSO  SEGUIOO  P1
VALENCA  PI  2401  53.9S  53.90  2361  -25S
SINPLICIO  HENtOS  PI  51  52.21  53.08  110  -38X
601AM4A  PE  W0  51.06  S4.34  SI53  -141
LINOEIRO  PE  -184  S4.59  55.16  -81  -171
NACAPAAN  PE  341  50.73  53.21  4871  -311
PALNARES  PE  281  S3.3S  52.77  61  -311
ATALAIA  AL  161  52.26  53.15  641  -291
AA  STO  ANTONIO  AL  541  S4.02  56.02  131S  -386
0015  RIACWOS  AL  41  50.69  S3.2?  3911  -301
MOR ISIOOR  AL
S LUIS QUITENOCE  AL  1013S  $14.02  54.69  3091  -301
CAJAZEIROS  PO
ESPERANCA  PS  151  53.88  54.73  401  -341
ITARAIANA  PO  11  53.15  53.51  241  -191
RIO TINTO  PB  m  2  8.09  59.24  486  -281
SAPE  PS  109X  52.59  S3.94  2186  -231
LAURO  FtEITAS  OA  1431  57.75  S2.62  -161  141
S ANTONIO  JESUS  54S  54.02  56.02  1311  -161
OA ESPERNCA  NS  10S  511.45  S10.86  89  -29m
CAZAIU  NB
CRIINTO  26S  1  .92  515.65  1241  -341
ITA8IRITO  NO  6  55.91  $13.67  285S1  -251
LLMA OA  NATA  N  341  56.  55.92  IS1  -161
OLIVEIRA e  -6a  58.20  513.65  53S  -171
SUN  JAROII NJ  421  56.16  515.17  2501  -231
CACHKEIRO  ACAU  RJ  ISS  5S.36  57.43  591  -171
PIRAI RJ  661  520.49  510.27  -61  -101
POICINiCU NJ  271  519.50  516.05  41  -171
ARACAU  ES  3261  S  21.76  8.16  601  -211
BAIIO  OUANOU  ES  3SX  56.06  S7.95  77S  -11I
UARRA  SAO  FRANCISCO  ES  J  54.76  510.34  £091  -25S
COICEICAO  BAUUA  ES  228S  54.22  58.30  5451  -31S
IUtA ES  S3  53.90  59.92  2401  -311
SERPA  ES  2211  S5.57  53.75  116S  41
JAU  S  31CSi  85.57  50.67  2131  -31
JACABA  SC  -341  $12.77  517.77  -91  -141
SAo  JOSE  SC  61  54.57  513.23  2061  -31
SO NISA1EL  SC  8on  S39.14  527.62  271  -201
WAI HMEO  AVEUCES
NOTEAST  63S  53.40  S4.48  2371  ($0.27)
ST  OF RUIL  231  510.61  511.40  134X  -161
WEISITED  AVERA6ES
NORTINIST  2  2.97  54.S3  931  -161
REST  OF  SZIL  94U  5$.11  57.47  7S  -11I
N Of OSSEUATION5S  48
NoPIIEAt  28
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euuiCiPIo  STAT  CHANGE  REVENUES  PER  UNIT  PERCENT  CHANGE  IN REVENUES
Projects  in  1978  UNITS  PRE-PROJ  PROJECT  PROJECT PLUS  5 YEARS
Abeatgtube  PA  521  811.36  SS.98  *201  -35N
Braganca  PA  31  t1.43  S3.63  2511  -16X
Capanm  PA  201  S3.16  82.98  131  -IS%
Narab.  PA  701  S6.05  J4.20  181  OX
Santar?  PA  1131  Sll.SS  $6.35  171  8B
Tucurut  PA  -71  83.79  SS.98  471  -133
Itacoataria  AN  131  85.68  S2.49  -501  -301
Manacapuru  AN  669S  814.05  83.25  786  -161
Aracati  CE  35S  S1.44  83.43  2221  -231
Canindi  CE  41  S0.47  82.61  4761  -221
Cacwavl  CE  651  83.16  84.38  1261  -1I
Cedro  CE  -S1  '1.32  J2.41  731  -221
Li1etro  do Norte  CE  136X  $4.07  83.49  691  -161
Naenb.ca  CE  271  S1.21  2.U4  1991  -261
Pstssotes  CE  ±661  85.18  82.34  211  -601
QuIN&dn  CE  161  $3.55  82.21  -268  -361
Tiangua  CE  111  80.09  $1.76  22021  -271
Flerleno  Pt  -211  81.SO  83.61  901  -21X
Guadalupe  Pt  3211  80.50  52.71  2166X  -6a1
Pernatbs  Pi  411  84.98  82.68  -241  -231
Picms  Pt  110  84.86  82.66  191  -161
Barreiras  PE  -411  81.87  JS.43  731  -30X
Grvata  PE  161  81.14  53.41  2471  -121
Itd  PE  91  S3.62  50.40  -681  291
Rio Formso  PE  350X  S25.22  512.67  12EX  -241
Salgusiro  PE  7n  84.60  83.08  IS  -11
Surubls  PE  1121  82.17  84.44  3341  -281
Vitorla  de S. Anteo PE  -111  S3.93  810.23  1331  -201
Petrolina  PE  31  10.75  810.57  1I  -7X
Palseira  dos  Indias AL  12X  56.81  87.4  221  -39X
Pao d.  Acuc  r  AL  321  $7.66  $4.53  -221  -381
Porto Calva  AL  141  $0.38  82.77  7311  -321
Pilar  AL  -101  80.82  84.94  4461  -33X
S.Joas de lai  AL  -IS  JO.89  82.58  1471  -381
Hari  Pe  -31  $0.26  $2.12  6831  -141
Nantetra  Pe  891  3.42  82.09  -3X  -22m
Padres  de Fogo  PS  24%  82.00  84.41  1755  21
Tafxaira  PS  SS  80.94  S1.04  161  -391
Alacclnhna  U  B1X  S9.03  59.57  25  -291
Cachostra  BA  .2S  $82.4  83.95  411  -211
Candetas  A  49*  84.29  $4.30  491  -8X
Ju auero  eA  69  SS.9  81.87  -411  -S%
.Fellx  BA  171  53.91  $2.63  -211  -211
Vera Crut  OA  20X  55.21  81.14  -741  20S
Lagarto  SE  27S  54.94  S3.09  -211  -30X
Tablas Barreto  SE  47X  82.93  S3.52  771  -8X
Alm  Pariba  Ha  35  811.52  $20.09  60X  -231
C4ld"  tN  3S  $9.65  813.92  SO0  -331
Guaramla  No  561  $12.09  l81.71  1411  -211
fuazupe  Ns  38S  817.70  821.56  66B  -141
Ibla  NG  SX  $6.41  88.U  121  -261
Oure Fino  me  301e  16.91  821.48  471  -33X
Ptots Nova  Ns  -91  58.00  820.95  2161  -21
S.Antonto do Monte  No  2  84.07  $6.66  1091  -11I
S.Osnt  "a  1in  88.40  $13.68  921  -261
S.5shattlao  do ParatiN  40*  830.26  820.14  -7X  -221_  39 _  ANNEX  III
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Afonco Claudio  ES  881  513-95  57.18  31  81
AnchIota  ES  868  52.80  $1.97  311  -191
Colatina  ES  301  S9.74  512.45  661  -231
fundao  ES  263%  54.71  S1.69  301  -12X
Guscut  ES  431  S5'7  59.79  143X  -271
Ibiracu  ES  491  56.38  57.7S  81X  -301
liso do Sul  ES  731  53.0  512.83  ISSX  -321
S.Gabriel da Plha  ES  19X  SS.01  511.78  1791  -31X
Bas Jesus do ItabpoRJ  9S  $7.01  S18.73  1901  -261
Cdauct  RJ  411  512.29  59.78  121  -291
Cantagalo  RJ  641  X  9.78  5l1.80  122X  -381
Cordearo  RJ  191  54.63  519.33  3971  -37X
Imedw  RJ  931  59.72  t14.09  1601  -341
Natividade  RJ  661  S7.45  9.81  11S9  -251
S.Flodlis  RJ  211  56.61  t13.25  1431  -261
S.Joaa  d  Barra  RJ  1101  53.41  52.98  831  -101
Saquar  in  NJ  631  53.20  58.74  3441  -1
Silva  Jardls  RJ  3951  56.66  53.73  1781  -211
Sananl  SP  11  54.65  512.40  1691  -161
Cas  Brance  SP  191  S23.85  520-39  21  -111
Jacupirfngi  SP  2491  121.50  58.82  431  -181
Mirasaol  SP  -6X  517.11  53.94  -781  391
Quluz  SP  S5  511.6I  $15.40  1061  -44X
Taqar1tinga  SP  231  554.54  534.04  -231  -211
Brusque  SC  251  $11.98  3  12.26  261  -211
Cacador  SC  1051  513.98  $14.87  1ies  -771
Htrvul  O Oesto  SC  481  $8.24  58.24  481  -141
Ibir_  SC  291  514.80  513.78  201  -141
Laguna  SC  3971  512.23  S7.85  2191  -101
Palmtos  SC  941  $13.98  513.40  881  -201
Talo  SC  131  58.98  513.80  741  -171
BSeta Goalve  RS  1691  S3:.98  SIS.93  301  -111
Carlos  SEboss  RS  371  S7.32  59.24  731  -S9
Getulto Vergs  aS  -391  58.98  517.44  186  -1IX
Lavres  do Sul  aS  -321  54.20  510.73  731  -I71
NOva  Prate  RS  51  513.44  S47.53  2701  -32X
S.Antonio da PatrulhRS  311  S10.64  S21.68  1671  -I71
S.Nmrco  RS  -51  514.62  526.08  701  -7
Chepada  dos G6uar1s*T  I16  51.28  57.49  592X  -331
tanara  Ca  Serra  MT  -221  51.38  58.82  2831  -S%
A  a  I  NS  61  56.05  $7.05  241  -151
UHE1GHTEO  VERAGES
NORTHUST  601  54.47  54.00  1961  -211
REST  OF  BRUIL  581  511.20  513.55  III  -21I
UEI6KTEO  AVERAGES
NORThEUST  24  54.69  54.78  27X  -161
REST  OF  81UZ1:  51  S12.46  S12.98  521  -181
N  OF  OBSERVATIONS
NORThEAST  4*
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Projects  in  1983  ME-PM  PRJECT  P*OJlC  PLUS  I  VA
COQIUgI  S1CO  AL  NA  $0.7?  -15S  -721
ANAPIBACA  AL
CNAA  uA
imwi_uf  BA  MA.  11.99  *371  sn
JUSSADA  UIA  NA  10.70  *sn  n
CENTRAL  OA
MUAA  0OS MINCS  UA  NA  1O."  131  271
XIXUE  XIOUC  uA  MA  $1.4S  -17  -121*
HIIOLANDIOA  CE  A  11.39  -12*  -*In
PIQUT  CAINEIMO  CC  NA  $0.67  -19  -211
COLIBAS  PA  NA  11.64  .231  -SS%
JUSCINElaRA  PA  NA  10.12  -411  -381
ITAITUBA  PA  NA  $3.13  125X  -75S
SMTO  AHTON10  TAUA  PA  MA  11.92  -4A  -961
tU,LUU  Pe  la  0.26  -311  -n1
PoCIMS  Pe  NA  10.61  121  -S91
PlO 1X  Pi  BA  $1.02  -371  -311
UPANEM  RX  BA  10.16  n1  -411
POCO  BRANCO  RN  NA  10.33  76Z  -251
CACOAL  RD
CAMACANI  it  NA  12.30  -451  -361
SAO  CRISTOVAO  SE  BA  10.06  -71  -31
RIFMIA  sP  MA  SI.M  -61  -341
UAICU  Sp  BA  14.71  -321  -to0
URANIA  SP  A  13.14  131  2in
LUISIANA  SP  NA  11.03  *161  -121
PEIOA  ItS  SP  BA  13.60  -IIX  -371
LAVINIA  SP  NA  S1.10  -411  -41
WA.  ARA  StP  NA  110.23  -201  -n
TESS  FITERIAS  SP  BA  14.57  sn  -In1
ESTIELA  DDEsT[  SP  B  5111.00  -311  -361
IRPEA  so
WLAAB  GO  MA  81.53  -351  -Su
PUR(I0 A OE  GOAS  1  60  BA  11.08  216  -101
FAZEBA  MOA  60  BA  11.02  -45%  -611
CAStIRA Of  GOIAS  60  BA  $5.12  -231  -6U
CM6  K  OEOUR0  60
MESUIOEMTE  VN  60
SACMELNIA  60  BA  11.61  01  -241
SUTE  QU"  NI  BA  11.13  -141  -411
UA 6A9RIEL  ooEsTE  N
COSTA  AICA  NS  BA  S1.61  411  -411
CANAPUA  NS  BA  11.22  -411  661
WATRS  NU  Ns  PA  13.14  -141  22
OlAATIUO  MT  BA  S1.40  -n1  2361
UO  BRANCO  MT  BA  10.21  -6S  -3lS
CA"IBA  PI  BA  13.25  s  6  -331
IIACIO  INATIA  PA  Ba  $3.73  -61  -7*
PAULO  FRWTIN  Pi  BA  10.61  -621  21S
SAO  MATtUS  00UL  PR  BA  14.36  e6n 
NAWIBR  PR  BA  $1.71  -201  iS%
JESUITAS  Pe
COIOIEL  SICACO  NS  BA  S5.51  1201  -SS
JAaAA  as  BA  IS.31  -211  -201
SANTO  CRI5TO  RS  MA  S11172  -22n  -301
CuILSUo  SC  BA  12.01  -201  201
ALfRIOG  WAnB  SC  tA  13.07  -231  -12
PIIATUUA  SC  BA  t4.94  -261  -n22
P1tSIOtXTt  CASTELO  tSC  MA  13.43  -471  -231
TLO4  SC  ItA  $8.27  41  -261
P1AlTIUA  SC  MA  12.61  161  -321
UI6NTGN AVERA4.S
MOTNAST  BA  S1.17  -I27  -345
MYS  OFIZIL  BA  S3.69  -31  -111
WIUIEDO  AVEMAES
MORTHEAtT  t0.87  -411  -415
KIT oW  1  IL  14.61  -51  -I7
M  OF  OBSIBVATIOMI
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Proj  ects  in  19  84  PRE-PROJ  PROJECT PRE-PROJ  PROJECT
*rasatle,  AC  NA  $1.43  -331  -1X
Chl Protc  AL
Jacare dos  Homns  AL  NA  S0.71  -151  -281
Uniao dos Palimras  AL  A  $0.35  32X  -475
It6julpe  BA  NA  S1.2?  95X  241
Monte Santo  BA  NA  S1.31  861  -14S
Rui Barbosa  OA  NA  SO.87  -411  -30X
Santa Cruz Cabrali  BA  NA  $0.13  21  35X
Assare  CE  NA  S3.31  -17X  2791
Ccrlrircu  CE  NA  $0.00  -371  -95S
Guarmi  rangc  CE
mulungu  CE
Pedro Branca  CE  NA  $0.41  -55%  -361
S,Joao  do Jaguaribe CE  NA  $0.77  -841  6411
Cartr.  SE
Riachoa  do ODntas  SE  NA  50.02  -281  -551
Vlgla  PA  KA  $2.58  241  6011
Fagundhs  PB  NA  50.01  -31X  -961
Alago  Nova  Pe  NA  $0.21  231  -451
Taperoe  Pe  NA  $0.03  -241  -89%
Laeoe  Sec.  Pe  NA  O0.25  -201  -301
Cancim S.  Felix  PE  NA  $0.69  -541  120X
Gloria  do Gait&  PE  NA  50.47  -2S  -17X
P*dra  PE
Vic4ncia  PE  NA  50.81  -4X  250X
Luis  Corrals  Pi  NA  50.01  34k1  -811
Legoa  de  Padrcs  RN
Sao Rafael  RN
Porto Velho  RO  NA  56.73  501  -611
Jo  Jardim  HA
Rosario  HA
2O Gaspacho  Ne  NA  51.68  -26X  -301
Centralina  li
Dalflnopols  No  NA  51.16  -371  871
Nanhuscu  No  HU  S1.81  -37S  84X
Rio Perdo  de Nines  NS  HA  $0.38  -63%  95S
S.BSnto  Abado  "G  NA  $1.17  1671  141
Viacod do Rio  ranKn  N  $2.42  -321  786
Nobr  N  IT  KA  S8.27  2405  1815
Pontes  *  Laccrda Nrt
Vilc  ole.  SantiasilNT  KA  51.39  13S  9S
Wera Cruz do Oasto  PR
Congonhinhua  PR  KA  56.17  611  971
Jaguerisava  PR  NA  52.83  77S  -31
eatelendil  PR  NA  $2.36  -311  oX
S.Jorge do PctroctniPR
Tapirs  PR  KA  51.40  761  -6X
F.liz  RS  RA  59.84  -26S  31
Nova eassano  RS  KA  55.94  -281  4I
Correc Pinto  SC
Ponte  Alt  SC  NA  53.29  -145  91
Barr  BOnits  SP  NA  52.48  -81  S
Nuporangs  SP  NA  $g.SS  -11  -3X
S.B5  nto do  Sapucal  SP  NA  54.64  -351  891
Sero  Alto  60  NA  80.91  431  681
Pilar  de  Goias  60
Qulrinopoll s  Go  A  S2.48  -49S  1041
Cacu  60  NA  52.39  -35S  -241
uNwEIGHTED  AVERAGES
NORTHEAST  KA  51.43  8S  561
REST  OF  BRAZIL  NA  53.98  121  431
WEIGHITED  AVERAGES
NORTHEAT  52.48  441  -551
REST  OF BRAZIL  52.57  -121  181
N OF MRSERVATIONS
NORTHEAST  19
REST  OF  B8AZIL  21